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The goal of this dissertation is to investigate the role of product returns and bad debts
(i.e., customers default, keeping the products without paying for them) in direct marketing. The
dissertation constructs several models to study return and bad debt behaviors as well as its
combined impact on firm profitability.
The dissertation consists of two essays, which have a common research objective, but
differ in the theoretical focus and methodology. Essay #1, “Targeting Dilemma at the Bottom of
the Pyramid,” sets up a seemingly unrelated regression model and a logit framework to measure
the differential impact of bad debt information on the profitability of a firm’s targeting policies
in a cross-sectional empirical context. While response is cross-sectional, this data involves
multiple waves of targeting of consumers by the firm, the essay solves the endogeneity problem
of non-random targeting. Results reveal a positive correlation between customer preferences for
the return option and those for the bad debt option. We suggest that the firm should target
customers with more payments or more returns in the past when the product return is not
allowed.
Essay #2, “A Structural Model of Default and Product Return Options with Implications
for Return Policies,” further studies the trade-offs between the return and default option by
developing a structural model and applying it to a panel dataset from a co-operative database in
direct mail. Our research finds that customers have lower price sensitivity and higher transaction
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fit uncertainty if we ignore defaults. Furthermore, this essay shows that customers’ trade-offs
between return and default option are influenced by their return and default costs as well as the
transaction fit of the product. Our research illustrates the importance of including the default
option when estimating demand and studying the optimal return policies for firms.
Overall, the dissertation helps researchers understand how customers trade off costs in
choosing the return and bad debt option in direct marketing, and helps managers incorporate
these behaviors jointly in making targeting decisions and return policies.
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Introduction Chapter

In the ‘direct response’ industry which largely serves the needs of customers who may have
limited or no access to credit card debt, many firms use a ‘bill me later’ payment mechanism and
allow customers to pay by check after receiving the product. This introduces a risk of costs that
could be incurred due to customers’ defaults (i.e., customers keep the products without paying
for them), termed the risk of ‘bad debt’ for firms.
Bad debts and product returns consume substantial resources, and lead to continual
inefficiency and sub-optimal profits for firms. Academic research has largely focused on the
effect of returns, detailing conditions under which return behavior can be profitable. Less is
known about the latter, even though predicting bad debt is an important marketing activity for
firms in the direct response industry.
The objective of this dissertation is to investigate return and default behaviors as well as its
combined impact on firm profitability. The dissertation consists of the follow essays:
Essay #1. Targeting Dilemma at the Bottom of the Pyramid, and
Essay #2. A Structural Model of Default and Product Return Options with Implications for
Return Policies.

Essay #1 measures the differential impact of bad debt information on the profitability of a
firm’s targeted marketing policies. We construct a logit framework and make an empirical
application to a dataset in a co-operative database. While response is cross-sectional, this data
involves multiple waves of targeting of consumers by the firm, the essay solves the endogeneity
problem of non-random targeting. We also model customer responses to firm targeting using a
1

seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach. The models are estimated by the maximum
likelihood procedure which selects the set of values for the model parameters that maximizes the
likelihood function. One major contribution of Essay #1 is that we find a positive correlation
between customer preferences for the return option and those for the bad debt option, which
implies that the bad debt option cannot be ignored in the study of product returns. This raises the
interesting question: what would be the impact on firm profits if it does not allow product
returns, thus effectively removing the return choice from the customer’s choice set?
As a first step towards understanding the answer to this question, we simulate probability
changes for the three options (bad debt, paid, and no order) after removing the return option, then
study the firm’s optimal targeting scheme when the return option is removed. Our results show
that removing the return option may actually increase the firm’s profit. Our framework suggests
that the firm should target customers with more payments or more returns in the past when the
product return is not allowed.
Essay #2 further studies the trade-offs between the default option and return option in direct
mail utilizing panel data on customer return and defaults. We set up a structural model with both
return and default options included, and compare it with the model in Anderson, Hansen, and
Simester (2009), which does not have a default option. We empirically apply the two models to a
panel dataset from a co-operative database. We use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm for
estimation.
A key contribution of Essay #2 is that we find out how customers choose between the return
and default option. Customers compare their return costs and default costs, and prefer the option
with a lower cost. Meanwhile, when the product fits the customer’s preferences better, customers
are more likely to keep the product, which means a preference for default over return. We find
2

estimates of product fit uncertainty and demand elasticities can be biased when we do not
consider the default option. This further illustrates the importance of including the default option
in customers’ choice set of responding to direct mail.
Essay #2 also contributes to helping firms design return policies when considering defaults.
We find that allowing product returns can increase customers paying probabilities. In addition,
having a strict return policy for product categories with higher uncertainty of transaction fit can
increase firms’ profits. As return costs are higher, customers may make orders more cautiously,
thus less likely to make returns afterwards, which helps reduce firms’ loss from product returns.
Overall, this dissertation helps researchers understand how customers choose between the
return and default options in direct marketing, and helps managers make targeting decisions and
return policies to reduce product return and bad debt costs.

3

Chapter 1

Targeting Dilemma at the Bottom of the Pyramid

4

Abstract

Dealing with ‘demon customers’ (Selden and Colvin 2003) consumes substantial
resources, and leads to continual inefficiency and sub-optimal profits for firms. Undesirable
behavior exhibited by such customers can manifest in two major types of behavior – unwarranted
returns and bad debt. Academic research has largely focused on the effect of returns, detailing
conditions under which return behavior can be profitable (Petersen and Kumar 2009). Less is
known about the latter, even though predicting bad debt is an important marketing activity for
firms in the direct response industry, which markets products to a substantial segment of
customers with limited access to credit card debt. For such customers transaction specific ‘credit
rating’ is not predetermined (as in credit cards), but is rather an integral part of the targeting
process through the ‘bill me later’ payment mechanism. Thus little is also known about the
following research question: what is the combined impact of both return and bad debt behaviors
on firm profitability? We study this important question with the help of a unique dataset from a
co-operative database, and find that direct response firms may benefit from reconsidering their
return policies by factoring in customer bad debt propensities and costs.

Keywords: Product return; Bad debt; Direct mail; Targeted Marketing
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1. Introduction
Firms targeting customers trade off maximizing response with minimizing costs due to
undesirable customers. Increasing credit card usage by US consumers (Durkin 2000) implies that
for most commonly studied firms costs of targeting undesirables are restricted to the costs of
returns, since the risk of non-payment is assumed by credit card companies. However there is a
substantial and largely understudied industry called the ‘direct response’ industry that largely
serves the needs of customers who may have limited or no access to credit card debt. Many firms
in this industry use a ‘bill me later’ payment mechanism that does not require a credit card.
Rather, customers most often pay by check after receiving the product. This introduces an
additional risk in the targeting decision of costs that could be incurred due to non-payment by
customers, termed risk of ‘bad debt’. Thus firms in the direct response industry grapple with dual
issues of minimizing returns and bad debt in crafting their targeting algorithms.
This dual optimization constitutes a non-trivial challenge to targeted marketing. Previous
research has underscored the need to account for propensity to return in targeted marketing, as
returns, while helping to reassure customers and build relationships under some conditions, can
also be potentially costly for firms. Product returns cost firms an estimated $100 billion annually
due to product depreciation and costs incurred in managing the return process can reach 35% of
revenues for some catalog retailers (Anderson, Hansen, and Simester 2009). Retailers allow the
product return option because customers are more likely to order the products when they have a
return option (e.g. Anderson, Hansen, and Simester 2009). Firms may penalize excessive return
behavior through various disincentives such as a penalty for returned products. Managing
product returns is complex since there is a non-linear (inverted U) relationship between the
number of product returns and a customer’s profitability to a firm.
6

By contrast bad debt has been relatively less studied in the marketing literature. Recent
research (Liu, Pancras, and Houtz 2015) has shown that firms can substantially improve profits
by incorporating information on customer bad debt behaviors in their targeting policies. When
examining the undesirable behaviors of returns and bad debt in tandem, the question that is of
paramount importance from the direct response firm’s point of view is the relative magnitude of
the costs of return and bad debt. In many cases the answer may not be as obvious as it may seem
at first glance. In fact in some situations the bad debt option cancost less than the return option
for the firm! This may be due to high labor costs related to operations such as product handling
or restocking costs, which may end up exceeding the cost of the product itself. This raises the
counter-intuitive research question that is addressed in this paper: what would be the impact of a
firm’s policy to not allow product returns1?
In this paper we measure the differential impact of bad debt information on the profitability
of a firm’s targeted marketing policies. We first calibrate the impact of return information,
largely replicating the relationships reported in earlier research (Petersen and Kumar 2009). Then
we measure the impact of adding bad debt information incrementally demonstrating its value in
predicting returns, then providing evidence for the need to explicitly incorporate bad debt
prediction into the targeting algorithm.
The major contributions of this paper to the literature on returns and customer targeting are
as follows. To our knowledge our study is the first to find a positive correlation between
customer preferences for the return option and those for the bad debt option, which implies that
the bad debt option cannot be ignored in the study of product returns. We also find that removing
Note that this would allow customers to retain products without payment (become ‘bad debts’) if they
choose to do so. While somewhat counterintuitive, this may be a plausible alternative for firms for whom
the cost of collecting bad debt is greater than the cost of the product.
1
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the return option may actually increase the firm’s profit: our framework suggests that the firm
should target customers with more payments or more returns in the past when the product return
is not allowed. Substantively this study is also, to our knowledge, one of the first to study unique
marketing issues related to the substantial segment of customers (of up to 28% of the US
population) who have limited or no access to credit card debt, and we term this segment as the
‘bottom of the pyramid’.
In section 2, we describe the related literature on product returns and targeting in direct
marketing. In Section 3, we construct the discrete choice modeling framework and compare the
possible models. In section 4, we estimate the models using data obtained from a Spanish book
company. In section 5, we use the estimates in section 4 to perform a simulation study of
removing the return option. In section 6, we discuss the optimal targeting scheme when the
return option is removed. We conclude in section 7.

2. Industry Background, Theory and Literature Review
2.1 The response/screening tradeoff in the direct response industry
Firms employing targeted marketing face a key tradeoff in terms of credit screening and
customer response. With the widespread use of credit cards in both online and offline commerce,
credit screening has largely been outsourced to the banks and companies that issue credit cards.
However the proportion of customers who do not own a credit card due to low income or past
credit issues is still about 28% of US consumers (Holmes 2014), which amounts to 65.8 million
consumers. Companies that serve this sizeable consumer segment have to find ways to screen out
consumers who are bad debts among these from those who will pay.
8

In addition to this structural targeting issue, there is likely an under-researched propensity
of customers to respond when they are invited to ‘buy now and pay later’, which could be
perceived as being given a ‘pass’ on screening. This is likely to exist not only among the 65.8
million customers who do not own a credit card, but also probably a sizeable proportion among
the 33% who own 1-2 credit cards and who may have limited credit. The ‘bill me later’ payment
mechanism is likely to cue impulse purchase (Rook 1987; Gilbride et al 2015) though we are not
aware of research that explicitly studies the mechanism underlying this tradeoff. However the
tradeoff exists, as is evidenced by the existence of the sizeable ‘direct response industry’ that is
described in the following section. While tracing this mechanism is, we believe, a fruitful area
for future research, in this paper we focus more on the managerial implications of this tradeoff in
a real field study using appropriate econometric methods to accurately document the response of
customers to targeted marketing in a direct response context. We also identify bad debt
prediction and management through refining targeting algorithms as one unique feature of this
segment that may be termed the ‘bottom of the pyramid’2.
While the terms ‘catalog marketing’ and ‘direct response’ are used in similar contexts,
catalog marketing often requires payment with a credit card or a check upfront. This is to be
distinguished from the direct response industry, where the payment terms are often on a ‘bill me
later’ basis. Essentially here the credit rating component of the commercial transaction is not
outsourced, but instead is made an integral part of the targeting process. In other words, targeting

We draw on terminology that was used by Prahalad and Hammond (2002) and Prahalad (2009) regarding
the potential benefits of targeting a large number of customers with lower purchasing power in developing
countries. However we apply the concept to the large segment of customers in the US with lower purchasing
power and limited access to credit card debt that often pose unique challenges to marketing practitioners.
We believe many of these challenges in targeting this ‘bottom of the pyramid’ in the West such as the bad
debt-return targeting tradeoff that we study represent under-researched opportunities for academic
marketing research.
2
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has to be optimized to not just maximize response, but also to minimize the possibility of bad
debt.
This paper examines bad-debt and return policies in the context of the direct response
industry, which approached $2 billion in revenues in 2014 (Statista 2013). We focus on a subset
of this industry known as the ‘bill-me-later’ market. These are direct response product or service
offers which do not require payment prior to order shipment. Bill-me-later offers expose the
marketer to the risk of consumer bad-debt, but simultaneously increases response rates. Many
well-known companies promote bill-me-later offers. MBI (collectibles, jewelry, gifts, Bradford
Exchange (collectibles, jewelry, gifts), Boardroom (newsletters) and Publishers Clearing House
(magazines, merchandise) have combined revenue approaching $1.5 billion3. Furthermore, many
of the 7,000 magazines published in the U.S. also offer bill-me-later options. The bill-me-later
business model has also morphed into major applications outside of the direct response industry
as well, probably to take advantage of its ability to increase response rates. A striking example
of this was the 2008 purchase by the leading online payments system company Paypal of ‘Bill
Me Later’, a company that extends credit on a transaction by transaction basis for almost $1
billion (Bruene 2008).
2.2 Product returns and bad debts

3

Industry sources and online links were accessed to obtain this estimate. See the following links:
https://www.statista.com/topics/1265/magazines/,http://www.mbi-inc.com/,
https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=publishers+clearing+house+revenue, all accessed November 4,
2016.

10

Two questions have dominated the research on product returns: (1) Should the firm offer a
return option? (2) Should the firm charge for the product return? Firms generally offer a return
option because customers are less likely to order products if the return option is not allowed
(Anderson, Hansen, Simester 2009). Firms also allow product returns from retailers if there is a
viable used market for the product, where customers have a high willingness to pay for used
products (Gümüs, Ray, and Yin 2013). Furthermore, product return behavior can be managed to
increase lifetime value of customers; Petersen and Kumar (2009) find that customer value is
maximized at an intermediate level of returns, rather than either a complete absence or an
extremely high level of returns.
As product returns can be costly, many retailers charge a restocking fee for the product
return. The return penalty may be more severe when product returns are salvaged by a channel
member because the retailer misses out on the generous refund from the manufacturer when the
retailer salvages returned units without the help of the manufacturer (Shulman, Coughlan, and
Savaskan 2010). However, things are different for online retailers. They should either institute a
policy of free product returns or at least examine their customer data to determine their
customers' responses to return fees (Bower and Maxham III 2012). This is because customers
who paid for their product returns decreased their post-return spending at that retailer; and those
who had free returns increased their post-return spending.
The extant literature on returns does not consider the bad debt option when studying returns.
Liu, Pancras, and Houtz (2015) have shown that the firm can significantly increase its profit after
incorporating bad debt behaviors. However they do not address the issue whether bad debt and
return behavior are related, or trace out consequent implications for firm targeting. An intriguing
possibility arising from this perspective of considering bad debt and returns as possibly related
11

behaviors is whether the firm may actually prefer bad debt to product return when the cost of
return is greater. This could occur if the firm were to find it optimal to not allow product returns
under certain conditions, which would provide a counterpoint to the recommendations of the
previous literature on product returns.
2.3 Non-random targeting in catalog mailing
Past responses of customers to firm targeting reveal their preferences, and it is common
practice in industry for firms to target customers based on their responsiveness to past targeting
by firms. While this is intuitive, the practice can cause bias in customer response models that do
not account for this non-random firm targeting behavior. Firms employing customer response
models to make targeting decisions thus have to correct for their own targeting behavior in the
past. In other words, before the firm decides to send a mailing to a certain customer, it should
consider how many mailings have been sent to that customer. Ignoring the targeted histories in
the modeling process for individual level targeting biases the parameter estimates (Dong,
Manchanda, and Chintagunta 2009). Several papers provide possible reasons for these biases.
For example, customers have an adverse reaction to direct mail activity because of heavy direct
mail activity by the firm in the past (Hartmann, Nair, and Narayanan 2011). But the effect can be
temporary. The negative influence of extra mailings on future responding decisions dies out after
one year (van Diepen, Donkers, and Franses 2009). When the firm sends mail intermittently and
achieves its full impact instead of continually mailing and diminishing their effectiveness, the
total response is higher (Ansari, Mela, and Neslin 2008). Firms can increase the profits when
targeting over multiple periods as opposed to a single period (Gonul, Frenkel Ter Hofstede
2006). In contrast to the earlier literature, which corrects for bias in purchase decisions only, our

12

study shows the effect of such bias in two additional response options, return and bad debt
customer response.
Most of the previous literature suggests that the firm should target customers with higher
probability to response. For example, Bodapati (2008) suggests that the firm should target
customers whose purchase probabilities will increase if they receive the targeted mailings. We
use sensitivity of purchase probabilities and measure the customers’ response probabilities under
the scenario where product returns are not allowed. A summary of major contributions of this
study with respect to the extant literature discussed above is given in Table 1.1.
*** INSERT TABLE 1.1***

3. Data and Models
The data is obtained from a co-operative database contributor which sells Spanish books by
direct mail4, and contains customers’ historical transaction information such as the number of
historical cancels/returns, the number of historical payments, the total return count and so on.
The company selected certain customers to send direct mail promotions on six dates5. There are
140208 customers and 200,779 observations in total.
We adopt a two-pronged modeling strategy to study the research question about the
interplay between return and bad debt modeling in the targeting decision of firms. In the first we
model as continuous dependent variables the responses of customers to firm targeting in terms of

The book is a single book called a ‘hints and tips type book’, written in Spanish. The type of promotion is
often called a ‘solo offer’, where just one item promoted in the mail piece.
5
These are termed archive dates by the company.
4

13

the number of orders placed, the number of returns and the number of bad debts. In the second
approach we model the probabilities of incidence of each of these discrete responses. We report
major findings from each approach below6. Below we develop a conceptual framework and
utilize the frame work to select predictors for the continuous and discrete response models which
are developed in subsequent sections.
3.1 Continuous response model
We model customer responses to firm targeting using a seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) approach. The simultaneous equations comprising this method are:
𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑇𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 (𝑇𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡2 )1/3 + 𝛼3 𝐻𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4 (𝐻𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡2 )1/3 + 𝛼5 𝑂𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼6 (𝑂𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡2 )1/3 + 𝛼7 𝑇𝐵𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8 (𝑇𝐵𝑁𝑖𝑡2 )1/3 + 𝛽′𝑍𝑂𝑅 + 𝜀𝑂𝑅

(1)

𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1 𝑂𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2 (𝑂𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡2 )1/3 + 𝛿3 𝑇𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4 (𝑇𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡2 )1/3 + 𝛿5 𝐻𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 +
𝛿6 (𝐻𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡2 )1/3 + 𝛿7 𝑇𝐵𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿8 (𝑇𝐵𝑁𝑖𝑡2 )1/3 + 𝜆′𝑍𝑅𝐸 + 𝜀𝑅𝐸

(2)

𝐵𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔1 𝑇𝐵𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔2 (𝑇𝐵𝑁𝑖𝑡2 )1/3 + 𝜔3 𝑂𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔4 (𝑂𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑡2 )1/3 + 𝜔5 𝑇𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 +
𝜔6 (𝑇𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡2 )1/3 + 𝜔7 𝐻𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔8 (𝐻𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡2 )1/3 + 𝜙′𝑍𝐵𝐷 + 𝜀𝐵𝐷

(3)

Where (𝜀𝑂𝑅 , 𝜀𝑅𝐸 , 𝜀𝐵𝐷 )′ ~ iidN(0, Ω′′)
Descriptions and descriptive statistics of each of the dependent and independent variables
are given in Table 1.2 below. The average number of returns is 0.05, and of bad debts is 0.03.
Note that ‘Hispanic order number’, indicating the number of Hispanic book orders, is
comparatively lower (mean of 2.24) compared to total order number (mean of 22.93). The
number of payments for related category (Hispanic) products is 1.84, showing that there is some

6

More details of the analyses are available on request.
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bad debt in historical related category purchases. The average number of previous mailings is
0.36, while the length of residence is 9.86 years on average.
***INSERT TABLE 1.2***
We first present model comparison results, with Model 1 estimating only Equation 1 and 2,
where coefficients are estimated using SUR without historical bad debt information in
independent variables. In Model 2, we add one-off bad debt ratio to model 1 to estimate the
system of equations. Finally in Model 3 we add Equation 3 also to the model and estimate the
simultaneous system of equations. In Table 1.3 below, we present the model comparison which
shows the predictive power of using bad debt information. This is especially apparent in the
comparison of Models 1 and 2, both of which predict the number of orders and the number of
returns. Model 2 however uses bad debt information (one-off bad debt ratio) to predict the
number of returns. Model 2 is clearly better than Model 1 in terms of log likelihood and AIC and
BIC measures. Model 3 demonstrates the importance of predicting the number of bad debts in
addition to the number of orders and number of returns.
***INSERT TABLE 1.3***
The results are fairly consistent across the three models, so we describe the results of Model
3. In the first panel of Table 1.4 below we present the results of predicting the number of orders
using model 3. The total number of historical orders positively impacts the number of orders, as
expected. The number of orders of Hispanic items negatively impacts the number of orders when
the non-linearity is taken into account. The positive significant coefficient for the number of
previous mailings suggests that the firmhas been targeting customers who are of higher potential.
Both the number of recent returns (in the last 5 transactions) and the ratio of bad debts have
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positive effect on the number of orders. This shows the importance of accounting for bad debt
information in predicting the number of orders, since those with a tendency to bad debt tend to
place a larger number of orders.
In the second panel we present results of predicting the number of returns. The number of
recent returns (in the last 5 transactions) is the strongest predictor of the number of returns. The
number of previous orders, especially previous orders of Hispanic products, also is predictive of
the number of returns. However the interesting result from this study’s point of view is that
there is a positive relationship between the ratio of bad debts and the number of returns. In other
words, customers who have more bad-debts tend to return a lot. This is different from the firm’s
belief that customers who return are conscientious while those who bad debt are not.In the third
panel we present results of predicting the number of bad debts. The main predictors of the
number of bad debts are historical behaviors of bad debt (one-off bad debt ratio) and payments,
especially for Hispanic products. The number of orders, especially that of Hispanic products, is
also positively related to the number of bad debts.
It has been difficult for the firm to use characteristics of a “returner” to model for returns,
because they returned products due to the gap between product quality and their expectations. It
may help the firm to predict returns with customers’ bad debt information as we find evidence
for a positive relationship between the return and bad debt options. Our finding raises the
question involving measurement of this effect: how will incorporating information about the
interaction of bad debt write-offs and returns impact targeting strategies of a direct marketing
firm? To answer this important question, we next utilize a discrete response approach that will
estimate probabilities of response of individual customers under different information conditions,
and develop targeting strategies based on these estimated individual-level probabilities.
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***INSERT TABLE 1.4***
3.2 Discrete response model
While the previous section modeled continuous response of customers, targeting algorithms
used in direct marketing are often based on customers’ discrete response to firm direct mailings,
which may take the form of not ordering (‘no order’), returning (‘return’), ordering but
defaulting on payment (‘bad debt’) and ordering and paying for the product(‘paid’). A discrete
choice modeling framework based on the multinomial logit model is thus suitable for modeling
this discrete customers response. Figure 1 shows the three possible structures for the logit model
according to the customers’ decision making process. We model customer choice among the four
options in a single stage as in Figure 1.1. As discussed in the Web Appendix, this single stage
model fits the data in our empirical context better than the alternative choice hierarchies shown
in Figure 1.2 and 1.3. Our discrete choice model incorporates heterogeneity in customer
response, and also incorporates the firm’s targeting policy in the two models to correct for
possible endogeneity.
***INSERT FIGURES 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 ***
3.2.1 Logit choice model
We utilize the logit model as the basic building block for our discrete choice modeling
framework. As shown in Figure 1.1, there are four discrete choice options (no order, return, bad
debt, and paid). As is standard, the intercept is normalized to zero for the last alternative (no
order choice) for identification. Intercepts for the other three alternatives (return, bad debt and
paid choice) are common across customers and capture the unobserved cost of each alternative
that must be overcome for the relevant choice to occur. Consider customer i who is mailed the
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promotion 𝑡𝑖 times, 𝑡𝑖 =1,…, 𝑇𝑖 , where 𝑇𝑖 could be 1,2,3,4,5,6. We assume the utilities of the four
response alternatives for customeri who receives mailings t times as:
𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅 + 𝜇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑅𝑖𝑡

(4)

𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵 + 𝜇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝐵𝑖𝑡

(5)

𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃 + 𝜇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑃𝑖𝑡

(6)

𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 = 0

(7)

R, B, and P are the intercepts for the three options, while 𝜇𝑅𝑖𝑡 , 𝜇𝐵𝑖𝑡 , and 𝜇𝑃𝑖𝑡 capture the
influence of the independent variables on each option. The independent variables are listed in
Table 1.2. 𝜀𝑅𝑖𝑡 , 𝜀𝐵𝑖𝑡 , and 𝜀𝑃𝑖𝑡 are the error terms which are assumed to follow a type I extreme
value distribution. The respective probabilities of each of the four choice alternatives for
customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝜋𝑁 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 =

𝜋𝑅 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡

𝜋𝐵 = 𝑃𝑟(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡 =

𝜋𝑃 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡

𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡

𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

Next we set up the likelihood function that will be maximized to estimate the model
coefficients. The indicator variables capturing the four mutually exclusive customer choices will
be as follows. 𝑌𝑃 is the customer’s choice of paying for the product, taking a value 𝑌𝑃 = 1 if
paid, otherwise 𝑌𝑃 = 0. 𝑌𝑁 is the customer’s choice of not ordering to the product: 𝑌𝑁 = 1 if no
18

order, otherwise 𝑌𝑁 = 0. 𝑌𝑅 is the customer’s choice of returning the product: 𝑌𝑅 = 1 if returned,
otherwise 𝑌𝑅 = 0. 𝑌𝐵 is the customer’s choice of bad debt: 𝑌𝐵 = 1 if bad debt, otherwise 𝑌𝐵 = 0.
ln(Likelihood) = ln((𝜋𝑃 )𝑌𝑃 × (𝜋𝑁 )𝑌𝑁 × (𝜋𝑅 )𝑌𝑅 × (𝜋𝐵 )𝑌𝐵 (1 − 𝜋𝑃 )(1−𝑌𝑃 ) × (1 − 𝜋𝑁 )(1−𝑌𝑁 ) ×
(1 − 𝜋𝑅 )(1−𝑌𝑅) × (1 − 𝜋𝐵 )(1−𝑌𝐵 ) )

(12)

The model is estimated by the maximum likelihood procedure which selects the set of values of
the model parameters that maximizes the likelihood function. In this way, we can obtain a logit
model that fits best with the observed data. With individual level panel data, it is particularly
important to account for possible biases due to heterogeneity and endogeneity, and we describe
how our model incorporates these aspects below.
3.2.2 Conceptual Framework and Variables Selection
Since direct response firms use discrete choice models to develop their targeting algorithms,
we develop a conceptual framework in Figure 1.4 to describe the drivers of such targeting
policies. While the variables will be developed using this framework for the discrete choice
models, the framework in Figure 1.4 is also applicable to the continuous response models
developed in the previous sub-section.
The no order option is set as the baseline, and we select four to five independent variables
for each of the other three options (return, bad debt, and paid), as listed in Table 1.5. The
independent variables are classified into two types. The first type of variable shows the
information of the firm’s target activities (number of previous mailings). The second type of
independent variables include customers’ historical behavior of previous choices (return, bad
debt, and paid) which will accommodate lagged interactions between the different choices. For
example, a customer’s past return behaviors could influence his current bad debt choices. These
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variables are selected to be consistent with the targeting framework shown in Figure 1.4. The
details of the independent variables for each of the three options (return, bad debt, and paid) are
discussed below.
***INSERT FIGURE 1.4 ***
There are four variables for the return option: previous mailings, bad debt number, Hispanic
payment number, and one-off return amount. Previous research (van Diepen, Donkers and
Franses 2009) shows that the extra mailings would irritate customers, leading to a lower response
rate. So here we expect the number of previous mailings the customer received in the past to
have a negative influence on his return option. Hispanic payment number also has a negative
influence on a customer’s return option in the continuous response study. Since the customer
who frequently returned products in the past is more likely to return products, the one-off return
amount is expected to positively influence a customer’s probability of return. The one-off bad
debt number is a variable indicating the customer’s historical bad debt behavior. This variable is
expected to positively affect probability of return.
Four variables are selected as drivers of bad debt: previous mailings, payments, one-off bad
debt ratio, and one-off return number. As mentioned above, we expect previous mailings to
negatively influence a customer’s probability of response. The one-off bad debt ratio is expected
to positive influence probability of bad debt, while the payments variable is expected to have
negatively influence probability of bad debt. These are based on arguments of inertia in customer
behavior, i.e. customers who exhibited bad debt in the past continue to exhibit bad debt behavior,
while those who tend to pay in the past tend to continue paying for the product in future. Note
that this may just represent observed heterogeneity in these behaviors over time rather than state
dependence. The one-off return number is included here to explore the relationship between the
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bad debt and return, and we expect this relationship to be positive, since there is a positive link
between these two undesirable customer behaviors.
Four independent variables are used to parameterize the utility for the paid option: number
of previous mailings, book bad debt number, Hispanic order number, total return number. The
number of previous mailings variable is expected to have a negative influence on the paid option
(van Diepen, Donkers and Franses 2009). The book bad debt number and total return number are
variables concerned with the customers’ historical bad debt and return behavior. We expect the
customers who frequently returned or wrote off in the past to be less likely to pay for the
product. Next we describe the discrete choice model components.
*** INSERT TABLE 1.5 ***
Heterogeneity
We incorporate heterogeneity in the intercepts R, B, P by assuming that they follow a
multivariate normal distribution across customers:
𝑅
𝛽1 = [𝐵 ] ~𝑁(𝜇1 , Ω1 )
𝑃

(13)

This model has been termed the ‘mixed logit’ model by Train (2009), and simulated maximum
likelihood method can be used to estimate the mixed logit model. Here the expected value of the
likelihood is replaced by an arithmetic mean calculated from the sample. If D draws (in our
application D equals 20) are made from from 𝑁(𝜇1 , Ω1 ), probabilities can be computed
conditional on each draw, and the average yields the simulated probability
1
𝑟
𝑃̌𝑖𝑗 = 𝐷 ∑𝐷
𝑟=1 𝐿𝑖𝑗 (𝛽 )

(14)
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Endogeneity
While the model developed so far will capture heterogeneity in customer response
behaviors, it does not account for the type of endogeneity problem that has been labeled ‘nonrandom response’ modeling (Manchanda et al 2004; Donkers et al 2006), which requires the
model to account for the firm’s targeting strategy. Rather than inefficiently sending out mailings
randomly to customers (an assumption of the standard discrete choice model developed above),
the firm targets some customers with its mailings by selecting customers based on past observed
behaviors. Not accounting for the firm’s targeting decisions will result in an upward bias in the
effect of a variable on the customer choice variable such as paid choice, bad debt or return.
Therefore it is important that the model be augmented to correct for the endogeneity problem
caused by the firm’s targeting.
Figure 1.5 shows the number of customers targeted in each of the six waves of mailings in
our data. The numbers of customers who received mailings in each wave are 2439, 1901, 1686,
1259, 1084, and 1413. Note that the last wave shows a heightened level of targeting activity on
the part of the firm, presumably to try and maximize response. In the first wave, we do not know
the firm’s full targeting decisions because there is no information about the customers who are
not targeted. Consequently we only model customers’ responses for the first wave. For the
second to sixth wave, we model both customerss’ responses and the firm’s targeting. The number
of customers who were targeted by the firm from the second to sixth wave are: 341, 577, 553,
575, and 736 (shown in Figure 1.5). For example, in the third wave, the firm targeted 577
customers from the customers who received mailings in wave one or wave two.
*** INSERT FIGURE 1.5 ***
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As described earlier we utilize the conceptual framework in Figure 1.4 to develop predictors
for firm targeting policies; the variables were decided upon based on inputs of the firm tasked
with developing the targeting algorithms. We use five independent variables to account for the
firm’s targeting: Previous mailings, total return number, recent bad debts, payments, and
whether the customer responded recently (responded recently). Previous mailings is motivated
by Van Diepen et al 2009b, who found that customers may be irritated by extra mailings, in
which case the firm would do well to avoid further targeting of such customers. We therefore
expect previous mailings to have a negative effect on the firm’s targeting decisions. The
remaining variables are related to customers’ response behaviors to direct mail. The coefficient
signs we expect for these variables are fairly intuitive: total return number and recent bad debts
are expected to negatively influence the firm’s targeting, while payments and recently responded
are expected to positively influence the firm’s targeting decisions, since the firm prefers to target
customers who have a track record of payments.
We use a logit model to describe the firm’s targeting. Let I𝑖𝑡 (t=2, 3, 4, 5, 6) denote the
targeting decisions of the firm for the wave t. The indicator variable I𝑖𝑡 equals 1 if the firm sends
a mailing to customer i at wave t, and equals 0 otherwise. The utility for the firm to send a
mailing to customer i at wave t is:
𝑈(I𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝑏 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀

(15)

where
𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1 Previous mailings + 𝛾1 Total return number + 𝛾2 Recent bad debts + 𝛾3 Payments +
𝛾4 Recently responded

(16)

The intercept b is assumed to follow a normal distribution:
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𝑏~𝑁(𝜇𝑏 , 𝜎𝑏 )

(17)

The utility of not targeting a customer is zero.
𝑈(I𝑖𝑡 = 0) = 0

(18)

The probability that the firm targets customer i at wave t is

𝜋1 = 𝑃𝑟(𝐼 = 1)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(I𝑖𝑡 =1)

(19)

1+𝑒 𝑈(I𝑖𝑡 =1)

The probability that the firm will not target customer i at wave t is
𝜋2 = 𝑃𝑟(𝐼 = 0)𝑖𝑡 =

1

(20)

1+𝑒 𝑈(I𝑖𝑡 =1)

The likelihood for the firms targeting model is
(Likelihood) 𝑇 = (𝜋1 )𝐼 × (1 − 𝜋1 )(1−𝐼)

(21)

Equation 12 provides the likelihood for the customer response model. As in Donkers et al
(2006), we can combine the likelihoods for the customer response model from Equation 12 with
the likelihood for the firm targeting model in Equation 21 to obtain the log likelihood of the full
model:
ln(Likelihood)𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 = ln(Likelihood) + ln(Likelihood) 𝑇

(22)

4. Discrete Choice Model Results
The results for mixed logit model which incorporates both heterogeneity and endogeneity
correction are shown in Table 1.6. The results are fairly intuitive, with variables capturing
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tendency to previously engage in a behavior positively influencing probability of the relevant
customer discrete response. For example, one-off return amount (coefficient 0.03;t-value 4.999)
positively impacts probability of return, one-off bad debt ratio (coefficient 2.003; t-value 6.258)
positively impacts probability of bad debt. Similarly, Payments (coefficient -0.401; t-value 3.677) negatively impacts probability of bad debt while Hispanic order number captures the
tendency to buy (and pay for) related product categories.
***INSERT TABLE 1.6***
Apart from these intuitive effects, interactions between the different choices provide some
interesting and less obvious predictors of customer discrete response. One-off bad debt number
(coefficient 0.459; t-value 2.37) positively impacts probability of returns, indicating that
customers who tend to bad debt in the past also tend to return the product. This could be due to a
malicious intent of procuring the product with the intention of using it and returning it once their
needs are satisfied, or due to a genuine lack of fit between the actual product (once it is
delivered) and their needs. It is beyond the scope of the data at hand to determine which of these
motivations drives their behavior. However the data shows evidence of this link between
historical bad debt and tendency to return. Another less obvious predictive phenomenon is the
impact of total return number on the probability of paid choice. While again the exact reason for
this predictive link is beyond the scope of the dataset we utilize, this link is not inconsistent with
the findings of the recent literature on returns. Kumar and Petersen (2009) discuss the dual
impact of returns on customer value, with moderate levels of returns acting as an enabler of
relationship building between the firm and the customer and the consequent creation of
switching costs for the customer. This beneficial effect of returns up to a threshold is predicated
on the customer being well-intentioned and ‘genuine’ in terms of their return behavior, in the
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sense that with respect to the purchase, a priori they try to maximize their utility, but a posteriori
find that there is lack of fit between the actual product and their needs. This is qualitatively
different from the a priori malicious intention of the customer who is either irresponsible in
terms of purchase and therefore returns inordinate quantities of products, or who wants to use the
product for a particular (social or consumption) occasion and then return the product, effectively
gaining ‘something for nothing’. There is some evidence from our results that in our empirical
context customers may be exhibiting this type of beneficial relationship between returns and paid
choice. One other piece of evidence that is suggestive in this context is the coefficient of one-off
return number in predicting the probability of bad debt choice probability. While this coefficient
(-0.608; t-value -1.525) is not statistically significant, the negative sign appears to provide some
evidence of the possible beneficial impact of returns in this dataset.
The firm targeting model coefficients in the bottom panel of Table 1.6 illustrate the
preoccupations and challenges of a direct marketing firm in terms of its targeting options. The
firm heavily mails those who have been mailed earlier (coefficient 0.563; t-value 11.564) and
those who have made their payments historically (coefficient 0.057; t-value 4.182). They also
avoid irritating customers by not targeting those who have responded recently (coefficient 0.097; t-value -1.875). The fact that total return number and bad debt in last five transactions
have negative coefficients approaching significance shows that while the firm is trying to avoid
such undesirable customers, it is still casting a wide targeting net as long as the customer has
made a sufficient number of historical payments.

5. Discussion
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In this section we discuss implications of our demand analyses by conducting simulations
utilizing the estimates from our discrete response model.
5.1 Comparative statics
From Table 1.6 we can infer that there is a positive relationship between propensity to
return and to bad debt, since customers who frequently took on bad debts in the past are more
likely to return products. Strategically this raises the interesting question: what would be the
impact on firm profits if it does not allow product returns, thus effectively removing the return
choice from the customer’s choice set? As a first step towards understanding the answer to this
question, we simulate probability changes for the three options (bad debt, paid, and no order)
after removing the return option, then study the firm’s optimal targeting scheme when the return
option is removed.
One empirical issue that the researcher needs to deal with in this dataset is the existence of
many zeros in the independent variables. For each of the variables, we choose the top 100
customers and the bottom 100 customers after removing the zeroes in the data. For example, in
the case of one-off return amount, we sort the 10023 observations by the one-off return amount
variable. The top 100 customers have a mean of 60.381 dollars of one-off return amount, while
the bottom 100 customers have a mean of 27.400 of one-off return amount. We calculate the
probabilities of the three options (no response, bad debt, paid) for each individual after removing
the return option, and list the mean probabilities for the top 100 customers and the bottom 100
customers in Table 1.7. We also perform t-tests to examine whether the distributions for the top
group and the bottom group are different, and p-values are listed in the table.
***INSERT TABLE 1.7***
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Our key result from this simulation is that the firm can make greater profits by removing the
return option. We first study the three variables concerned with the historical return behavior.
The variable one-off return number decreases the probability change for bad debt while
increasing the probability change for paid. Since there is no nesting structure in the discrete
choice model, customers can consider the return option with the other options simultaneously,
which results in the return variables having greater influence. The one-off return number slightly
decreases the probability change for the no response option while slightly increasing the
probability change for the paid option. Customers who returned a lot in the past are more likely
to choose the paid option if the return option is removed, and are less likely to choose the no
response option. The number of previous mailings increases the probability change for the no
response option and decrease the probability changes of bad debt and paid choice.
Next we study the impact of historical bad debt behavior. The book bad debt number
slightly increases the probability of bad debt if the return option is removed. This is not
surprising because the customers who frequently took on bad debt can still choose bad debt after
the return option is removed. Finally, we look at the variables concerned with historical payment
or order behaviors. All these variables (Hispanic payment number, Hispanic order number, and
payments) negatively influence the no response probability while positively influencing the paid
choice probability. We then rank by the variable one-off bad debt number, and we find that the
customers with higher one-off bad debt number are more likely to take on bad debts.
5.2 Impact on profits
Next we simulate the firm’s targeting strategy by assuming the costs/profit of the four
options and calculate the expected profit of each customer. The customers are targeted on the
basis of positive expected profits. There is a mailing cost and targeting cost for no response, and
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we assume this cost to be c=$0.5 based on current mailing costs. For the bad debt option, there is
a cost for the product (a Spanish magazine) in addition to the mailing cost, so we assume the
total cost to be b=$5. The return option is even more costly due to handling and restocking cost,
so we assume it to be r=$8. It is to be noted that these costs, though seemingly somewhat
counter-intuitive, were obtained based on feedback from the management of the direct response
company and reflect actual costs for this particular company . The paid option is the only
profitable option, and we assume the profit to be v=$15 for each magazine. The number of
customers targeted and the profits are listed in Table 8. We find that the total profit is $7883 if
product returns are allowed, but it increases to $10628 when product returns are not allowed.
Assume the utilities of customers’ options are 𝑢1 , 𝑢2 , 𝑢3 , and 𝑢4 , then the expected profit
increase when product returns are not allowed is
∆𝐸𝑃 = (𝑒 𝑢1

𝑒 𝑢2
+𝑒 𝑢2 +𝑒 𝑢3 +𝑒 𝑢4 )(𝑒 𝑢1 +𝑒 𝑢3 +𝑒 𝑢4 )

𝑐

𝑏

𝑣

𝑟

𝑟

𝑟

× 𝑟 × (− × 𝑒 𝑢1 − × 𝑒 𝑢3 + × 𝑒 𝑢4 + 𝑒 𝑢1 +

𝑒 𝑢3 + 𝑒 𝑢4 )

(23)
𝑒 𝑢2

Since (𝑒 𝑢1 +𝑒 𝑢2 +𝑒 𝑢3 +𝑒 𝑢4 )(𝑒 𝑢1 +𝑒 𝑢3 +𝑒 𝑢4 ) > 0 and r>0, the expected profit will decrease only
𝑐

𝑏

𝑣

if (− 𝑟 × 𝑒 𝑢1 − 𝑟 × 𝑒 𝑢3 + 𝑟 × 𝑒 𝑢4 + 𝑒 𝑢1 + 𝑒 𝑢3 + 𝑒 𝑢4 ) < 0.
We have found that the firm can increase profit by not allowing product returns with the
option cost set at the set of values given by {c=0.5, b=5, r=8, v=15}. Next, we will change the
option cost set to study whether the profit will decrease when product returns are not allowed.
We will fix r and change c, b, and v respectively to see how profit changes.
Firstly, we study how profit will change with variation in bad debt cost b. When we fix
profit v, we have results shown in Figure 1.6. The horizontal axis shows the ratio of bad debt
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cost to return cost(b/r), while the vertical axis shows the ratio of the profit when product returns
are not allowed to the profit when product returns are allowed. We find that the profit ratio
slightly decreases when bad debt cost increases. However, whether the profit ratio will be less
than 1 is mainly decided by the ratio of targeting cost to return cost (c/r) instead of the ratio of
bad debt cost to return cost (b/r). When we fix c, we have results shown in Figure 1.7, which are
similar to those in Figure 1.6. Therefore the bad debt cost has little influence on the profit ratio.
Next we study how profit changes with changes in the targeting (and mailing) cost c.
Since b has little effect on profit, we fix b=c. Figure 1.8 shows that the profit ratio decreases
steeply when targeting cost c increases. That is, the company cannot increase profit by not
allowing product returns when targeting cost is higher. A possible reason is that customers are
less likely to order products when product returns are not allowed. However, the total cost for the
company is higher as targeting (and mailing) cost increases, and therefore the company can lose
profit if product returns are not allowed.
Last we study how profit changes when v changes. Since b has little effect on profit, we
fix b=c. Figure 1.9 shows that when v is high, the company can increase profit by not allowing
product returns, which is the main finding of our paper.
***INSERT FIGURES 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9 ***
Although this analysis has some limitations since it is not a field experiment, the simulation
analyses demonstrate that the customers who are likely to return products are likely to pay for the
products rather than become bad debts when there is no return option. It should be noted that
this result has an intuitive appeal, since customers who take the time and effort to repackage a
product, go to the post office and mail it, are more conscientious than customers who bad-debt.
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This leads us to the conclusion that as long as the firm has a small cost of ‘no response’ (as
captured by mailing and targeting costs), it can increase profit by adopting the strategy of not
allowing product returns.
5.3 Return -bad debt tradeoff: simulation diagnostics
The results show that the one-off bad debt number has a significantly positive influence on
the return option, while a similar variable one-off bad debt ratio has a significantly positive
influence on the bad debt option. Across the continuous and discrete response studies, there is
some evidence that historical returns behavior negatively influences propensity to bad debt.
The simulation results show that the customers with high bad debt numbers would still
choose the bad debt option if the return option is removed. However, the customers with high
return numbers would choose to pay for the products rather than take on bad debts. And the
customers with high payment numbers are also more likely to pay for products. Therefore the
firm should target customers with more returns and more payments in the past.
The cost of bad debt option seems to have little influence on the profit change when the
firm does not allow product returns. Only when the cost of no order is as high as half of the
return cost will the firm suffer losses by not allowing product returns. Since the no response cost
is generally not very high, the firm can increase profits by not allowing product returns.
There is some limitation to the simulation study. In the simulation study, we obtain the
estimates when there are four choices in the model, remove the return option and assume the
estimates do not change when the return option is removed. However, as the Lucas’ critique
states, economic agents who observe the new policy (no return option is offered) may change
their response to the stimulus (targeted offers). In other words, the estimates of the demand
31

model that captures customer response may differ from that estimated in this reduced form
model. Therefore the probability changes for the three options (no order, bad debt, and paid) may
be different from those obtained in the demand analysis. There are two methods to address this
issue: one, a structural model that builds up customer response from primitives of customers and
firm behavior. And two, a field experiment that allocates customers randomly to conditions
where the return option is present/absent. We position our work as the first evidence of a positive
link between the two undesirable customer behaviors of bad debts and returns, and believe that
the structural approach and/or field experiment approach can be fruitful avenues for future
research.
Our paper suggests the firm remove the return option, which is at odds with the findings in
Anderson, Hansen, Simester (2009). They find that the customers are less likely to respond when
the return option is not allowed, thus suggesting the return option should be offered. However,
they do not consider the bad debt option, which in our application costs much more than the no
order option. Table 7 shows that the targeted customers have a higher mean probability of no
order when the return option is removed, which is consistent with the findings in the earlier
literature. However, the mean bad debt probability of the targeted customers only increases a
little when product returns are not allowed. As a result, the loss caused by the product returns
and bad debts are greatly reduced when the return option is not offered. This implies that even
though the customers are less likely to respond on average, the firm can make a greater profit by
not offering the return option.
5.4 Return and bad debt: a ‘bottom of the pyramid’ phenomenon?
Customers could react in several different ways when they receive a catalog. They could
ignore the catalog or they could place an order from it. In the latter case, they may choose to
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keep the product or return it. Customers could be conscientious, honestly frustrated or
exploitative in their return behavior, and the difficulty of managing this process stems largely
from the difficulty in ascertaining ‘good’ intentions from ‘bad’ ones. Studies on product returns
have generally been conducted for target segments for whom payment is not an issue, as most
payments are made by credit card, and the decision regarding credit-worthiness of the customer
is predetermined by the company that issued the credit card on which the purchase was made.
When such merchants who rely mostly on credit cards for payment engage in targeted marketing,
their targeting algorithms do not need to consider whether the customer is credit-worthy. In
contrast, firms engaging in direct response marketing often target a segment of the market that
are of lower income, and who may often not have, or use credit cards for discretionary
purchases. In these types of ‘bill me later’ transactions, the product is purchased first, and the
payment is made, usually by check, on receipt of the product. In these direct response
transactions, the estimation of credit-worthiness of the customer is endogenized into the targeting
algorithm. Motivations for the other undesirable behavior of ‘bad debt’, where customers just
keep the product without paying for it, are less ambiguous, stemming either from sheer
forgetfulness or a clear-cut intention to cheat the firm. Yet bad debts can also be difficult to
predict and to manage, especially in the case of “buy-now-pay-later” payment option that is often
offered for small ticket items. While tracing out motivations for these undesirable behaviors is an
important research question, it is beyond the scope of the data utilized in this study. Our
analyses do present some findings that throw some light on possible inter-relationships between
these undesirable behaviors and raise questions about whether this phenomenon could be unique
to customers with limited or no credit card debt availability, i.e., the ‘bottom of the pyramid’.
Customers could be utilizing separate mental accounts (Thaler 1985) for bad debt and returns
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where they trade off actual costs as well as psychic costs they might incur in each scenario.
Optimization of such costs across transactions could lead to some of the linkages between
undesirable behaviors that our analysis uncovers.
Our results support the findings of the literature on returns by providing a further piece of
evidence - that customers who return are largely customers who tend to pay rather than bad debt.
This is so even among customers with low (or no) access to credit card debt. Our
recommendations that firms should seriously consider dropping the return option for at least
some of their ‘bill me later’ campaigns is based on the economics of return costs rather than on
the profile of customers who tend to return products. Our research finding may not apply to
bigger ticket items, where the temptation to bad debt may be higher if there is no return option.
However it should be noted that in those cases the economics of the transaction would mean that
there are likely to be greater collection efforts on the part of the firm. The other interesting
implication of our finding has to do with the online ‘bill me later’ options such as the one
proposed by the company acquired by Paypal in 2008. It is to be noted that in this case the
linkage between undesirable behaviors that we detect in the case of a single firm is still likely to
exist. However the tradeoff of the greater risk of bad debt versus higher response rate would
now occur across two firms. These are the online ‘bill me later’ firm that guarantees credit and is
responsible for collection of debt, and the targeting firm that enjoys the higher response rate, and
that pays some of the returns from this as a fee to the ‘bill me later’ company.

6. Conclusion
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This paper studies the customers’ responses to direct mail considering both the bad debt and
return options by utilizing the historical transaction information variables that influence the
customers’ return, bad debt, and paid options. We find that customers with high payment
numbers are less likely to make returns or bad debts, while those who frequently took on bad
debts in the past are more likely to take on bad debts and more likely to return products. Also,
customers who ordered a lot of products in the past are less likely to pay for the products.
Overall, we believe that the challenges to targeted marketing uncovered by this study constitute
the beginning of a possibly rich set of research questions that can arise from studying the ‘bottom
of the pyramid’ marketing phenomenon, i.e., unique challenges and variants of marketing
concepts that are applied in marketing to customers with limited or no access to credit card debt.
The paper also studies the impact of removing the product return option. The results show
that the customers with high return numbers in the past are more likely to pay rather than take on
bad debts if the product return is not allowed. The customers with high write-off numbers may
become bad debts, while the customers with high payment numbers are more likely to pay for
products. Therefore customers with high return numbers and high payment numbers are the most
profitable for the firm. We also demonstrate that the firm can increase its profit by forbidding
product returns if the no response cost is not too high.
There are some limitations in this research. First, we only consider the heterogeneity in the
intercepts in this paper. We can improve this by assuming all of the coefficients to follow
distributions in future research. Second, the customer demand functions estimated can be
considered a first approximation due to the reduced form approach and applicability of the Lucas
Critique. Nevertheless, this paper provides the first step in the measurement of the tradeoff
between bad debts and returns in the targeting literature. In spite of the limitations, the paper
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contributes to product returns in direct mail by considering the bad debt option together with the
return option. We find some positive interactions between the customers’ historical return
behaviors and their possibilities to take on bad debts. We also provide evidence for a counterintuitive strategy whereby the company reduces return costs by not allowing the product returns,
and thus increase profits. Firms that resort to this option may explore other avenues for
relationship building such as loyalty programs to substitute for the relationship-building
component of returns behavior described in Petersen and Kumar (2009).
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Appendix 1: Nested logit models

In the first structure, customers decide to choose one of the four options in a single stage.
In the second structure, customers decide to order or not in the first stage and then choose the
other options in the second stage. In the third structure, customers make all the decisions in three
stages. We are using the first structure in this paper, and the reason is shown in the appendix.
1. Nested Logit Model B
There is a two-level nesting structure (Figure 1.2) in the nested logit model B. When a
customer receives a direct mailing, she will first decide to order or not. If she does not order, she
takes a no order option. If she orders the product, she will have three options in the second level:
return, bad debt, and paid. The intercepts are still the same for all customers in this model.
Consider customer i who is mailed the product 𝑡𝑖 times, 𝑡𝑖 =1,…, 𝑇𝑖 , where 𝑇𝑖 could be
1,2,3,4,5,6. We assume the utilities of the three response alternatives in the second level for
customer i who receives mailings t times as:
𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅 + 𝜇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑅𝑖𝑡
(A1)
𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵 + 𝜇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝐵𝑖𝑡

(A2)

𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑃𝑖𝑡

(A3)

The probability of returning the product is conditional on ordering the product for customer i
who receives mailings t times:
𝑃𝑟(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛|𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡

(A4)

The probability of bad debt is conditional on ordering the product for customer i who receives
mailings t times:
𝑃𝑟(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡|𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡

(A5)

The probability of paying for the product is conditional on ordering the product for customer
i who receives mailings t times:
𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑|𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡

(A6)

The inclusive value for ordering the product for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡 )
(A7)
The utility of no order for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 = 𝑁

(A8)

The probability of ordering the product for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝑃𝑟(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑐×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡

(A9)

𝑒 𝑐×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡

The probability of not ordering the product for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝜋𝑁 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑐×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡
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(A10)

The probability of returning the product for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝜋𝑅 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡

×

𝑒 𝑐×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑐×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡

(A11)
The probability of bad debt for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝜋𝐵 = 𝑃𝑟(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒

𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡 ×

𝑒 𝑐×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑐×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡

(A12)
The probability of paying for the product for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝜋𝑃 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡

×

𝑒 𝑐×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑐×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡

(A13)
The log likelihood is
ln(Likelihood) = ln((𝜋𝑃 )𝑌𝑃 × (𝜋𝑁 )𝑌𝑁 × (𝜋𝑅 )𝑌𝑅 × (𝜋𝐵 )𝑌𝐵 (1 − 𝜋𝑃 )(1−𝑌𝑃 ) × (1 − 𝜋𝑁 )(1−𝑌𝑁 ) ×
(1 − 𝜋𝑅 )(1−𝑌𝑅) × (1 − 𝜋𝐵 )(1−𝑌𝐵 ) )
(A14)
The model is estimated by the maximum likelihood procedure which selects the set of values of
the model parameters that maximizes the likelihood function. In this way, we can obtain a logit
model that fits best with the observed data.
2. Nested Logit Model C
There is a three-level nesting structure (Figure 1.3) in the nested logit model C. When a
customer receives a direct mailing, she will first decide to order or not. If she does not order, she
makes a no order option. If she orders the product, she will have two options in the second level:
return or keep. If she decides to keep the product, she will enter the third level to have two options:
bad debt or paid. The intercepts are the same for all customers in this model.
Consider customer i who is mailed the product 𝑡𝑖 times, 𝑡𝑖 =1,…, 𝑇𝑖 , where 𝑇𝑖 could be
1,2,3,4,5,6. We assume the utilities of the two response alternatives in the third level for customer
i who receives mailings t times as:
𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵 + 𝜇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝐵𝑖𝑡
(A15)
𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑃𝑖𝑡

(A16)

The probability of bad debt is conditional on keeping the product for customer i who receives
mailings t times:
𝑃𝑟(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡|𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡

(A17)

The probability of paying for the product is conditional on keeping the product for customer
i who receives mailings t times:
𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑|𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡

(A18)

𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡

The inclusive value for keeping the product for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝐼𝑉(𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡 )
(A19)
The utility of return for customer i who receives mailings t times is
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𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅 + 𝜇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑅𝑖𝑡

(A20)

The probability of returning the product is conditional on ordering the product for customer i
who receives mailings t times:
𝑃𝑟(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛|𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡

(A21)

𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑐1 ×𝐼𝑉(𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡

The probability of keeping the product is conditional on ordering the product for customer i
who receives mailings t times:
𝑃𝑟(𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝|𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑐1 ×𝐼𝑉(𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡

(A22)

𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑐1 ×𝐼𝑉(𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡

The inclusive value for ordering the product for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝑒 𝐼𝑉(𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 )
(A23)
The utility of no order for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 = 𝑁

(A24)

The probability of ordering the product for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝑃𝑟(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑐2 ×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡

(A25)

𝑒 𝑐2 ×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡

The probability of not ordering the product for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝜋𝑁 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡

(A26)

𝑒 𝑐2 ×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡

The probability of returning the product for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝜋𝑅 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑐1 ×𝐼𝑉(𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡

×

𝑒 𝑐2 ×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑐2 ×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡

(A27)
The probability of bad debt for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝜋𝐵 = 𝑃𝑟(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡 =
𝑒 𝑐2 ×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡

𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡

×

𝑒 𝑐1 ×𝐼𝑉(𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑐1 ×𝐼𝑉(𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡

×
(A28)

𝑒 𝑐2 ×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡

The probability of paying for the product for customer i who receives mailings t times is
𝜋𝑃 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 =

𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝐵𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖𝑡

×

𝑒 𝑐1 ×𝐼𝑉(𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑐1 ×𝐼𝑉(𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡

×

𝑒 𝑐2 ×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡
𝑒 𝑐2 ×𝐼𝑉(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 +𝑒 𝑈(𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡

(A29)
The log likelihood is
ln(Likelihood) = ln((𝜋𝑃 )𝑌𝑃 × (𝜋𝑁 )𝑌𝑁 × (𝜋𝑅 )𝑌𝑅 × (𝜋𝐵 )𝑌𝐵 (1 − 𝜋𝑃 )(1−𝑌𝑃 ) × (1 − 𝜋𝑁 )(1−𝑌𝑁 ) ×
(1 − 𝜋𝑅 )(1−𝑌𝑅) × (1 − 𝜋𝐵 )(1−𝑌𝐵 ) )
(A30)
The model is estimated by the maximum likelihood procedure which selects the set of values
of the model parameters that maximizes the likelihood function. In this way, we can obtain a
logit model that fits best with the observed data.
3. Mixed Logit Model E (with Heterogeneity)
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The mixed logit model E is obtained by adding heterogeneity to model B. The variables R,
B, N are varying among different customers in this model. We assume them to follow a
multivariate normal distribution.
𝑅
𝛽2 = [ 𝐵 ] ~𝑁(𝜇2 , Ω2 )
𝑁

(A31)

We use the simulation method to estimate the mixed logit model. The expected value is replaced
by an arithmetic mean calculated from the sample.
Draw 20 values from 𝑁(𝜇2 , Ω2 ) and calculate the probability. The average is the simulated
probability
1
𝑟
𝑃̌𝑖𝑗 = 20 ∑20
𝑟=1 𝐿𝑖𝑗 (𝛽 )

(A32)

4. Mixed Logit Model F (with Heterogeneity)
The mixed logit model F is obtained by adding heterogeneity to model C. The variables R,
B, N are varying among different customers in this model. We assume them to follow a
multivariate normal distribution.
𝑅
𝛽3 = [ 𝐵 ] ~𝑁(𝜇3 , Ω3 )
𝑁

(A33)

We use the simulation method to estimate the mixed logit model. The expected value is replaced
by an arithmetic mean calculated from the sample.
Draw 20 values from 𝑁(𝜇3 , Ω3 ) and calculate the probability. The average is the simulated
probability
1
𝑟
𝑃̌𝑖𝑗 = 20 ∑20
𝑟=1 𝐿𝑖𝑗 (𝛽 )

(A34)

5. The comparison of the six models
Table A1 shows the values of both AIC and BIC for the six models. We find that the
models with heterogeneity considerably outperform the homogeneous models. Among the
heterogeneous models, the model F with a three level nesting structure is best according to AIC,
but model D without any nesting structure performs best according to BIC.
We are doing a simulation study of removing the return option in this paper. When we
remove the return option, the attractiveness of “order” decreases. Therefore, customers should be
more likely to choose no response. However, if we use model F, more customers are going to
respond when product returns are not allowed, which is in conflict with our analysis. Thus we do
not use nested logit models in this paper.
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Table A1: The comparison of the models without targeting policy
Model

n

k

ll

aic

bic

Logit model A

10023

15

2918.51

5867.02

5975.21

Nested logit model B

10023

16

2912.45

5856.9

5972.30

Nested logit model C

10023

17

2907.56

5849.12

5971.73

Mixed logit model D

10023

21

2076.48

4194.96

4346.43

Nested logit model E

10023

22

2072.54

4189.08

4347.76

Nested logit model F

10023

23

2068.8

4183.6

4349.49
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Table 1.1. Summary of Literature
Paper

Main question

Main findings

Type

Choice
Alternatives

Anderson,
Hansen,
Simester
(2009)

Return option
value

The customers are less likely to order
the products if the return option is
removed.

Empirical

No
response,
buy, return

Gümüs, Ray,
and Yin
(2013)

Return policy
and customer
valuation of
used products

The higher the customer valuation of
used products is, the more likely the
company would offer a return option to
the retailer.

Analytical No
response,
buy, return

Petersen and
Kumar (2009)

Return
behavior and
CLV

As returns increase, the lifetime value of Empirical
a customer increases first and then starts
decreasing.

Shulman,
Coughlan, and
Savaskan
(2010)

Return penalty

The return penalty may be more severe
when returns are salvaged by a channel
member who derives greater value from
a returned unit.

Analytical No
response,
buy, return

Bower and
Maxham III
(2012)

Free returns
vs. fee returns

Customers who paid for their own
return decreased their postreturn
spending at that retailer, and vice versa.

Empirical

No
response,
buy, return

Hartmann,
Nair, and
Narayanan
(2011)

Causal
marketing mix
effects

Customers have adverse reactions to
direct mail activity because of heavy
direct mail activity by the firm in the
past.

Empirical

No
response,
response

van Diepen,
Donkers, and
Franses (2009)

Dynamic
effects and
competitive
effects

Each extra mailing the same charity
sends negatively affects the future
responding decision; but the effects die
out in one year.

Empirical

No
response,
response

Gonul, Frenkel Mailing
Ter Hofstede
strategies
(2006)

The expected profits are higher when a
longer time horizon is employed than a
single-period horizon.

Empirical

No
response,
response

Ansari, Mela,
and Neslin
(2008)

Customer
channel
migration

The total response can be higher by
sending e-mails intermittently than by
continually e-mailing.

Empirical

No
response,
response

Bodapati
(2008)

Targeting with
purchase data

The targeting should be based on the
sensitivity of purchase probabilities
instead of the purchase probabilities.

Empirical

No
response,
response
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No
response,
buy, return

Dong,
Manchanda,
and
Chintagunta
(2009)

Targeting in
the presence of
firm strategic
behavior

Ignoring firm strategic behavior in the
modeling process biases the parameter
estimates

Empirical

No
response,
response

This Study

Targeting
Historical bad debts predict return
‘bottom of
probabilities; firms can increase profit
pyramid’
by dropping the return option.
customers with
return-baddebt tradeoff

Empirical

No
response,
paid, return,
bad debt
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics – Continuous Response Model

Variable
Name
Order
Return
Bad debt
TON
HON

ORN
TBN

Variables description
One-off order number
One-off return number
One-off bad debt number
Total order number
Cube root transformed squared total order
number order number
Hispanic
Cube root transformed squared Hispanic order
number

Mean Std
Min Max
1.1
1.74
0
40
0.05
0.29
0
10
0.03
0.24
0
10
22.93 46.58
1
877
6.38
7.62
1 91.62
2.24
3.01
0
46
1.44
1.32
0 12.84

One-off return number of the last 5 transactions
Cube root transformed squared one time return
number
lastratio
5 transactions
One-off of
badthedebt
Cube root transformed squared one-off bad debt
ratio
Number
of previous mailings
Length of residence
Number of previous mailings
Length of residence
Number of payments for Hispanic products
Number of payments
Number of previous mailings
Length of residence
Number of payments for Hispanic products
Number of payments
Days since last order

0.23
0.19
0.07
0.08
0.36
9.86
0.36
9.86
1.84
2.78
0.36
9.86
1.84
2.78
397.31
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0.66
0.5
0.25
0.26
0.64
10.23
0.64
10.23
2.72
1.6
0.64
10.23
2.72
1.6
377.3

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

5
2.92
1
1
5
52
5
52
45
5
5
52
45
5
1826

Table 1.3: Model Comparison – Continuous Response
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Order equation

Yes

Yes

Yes

Return equation

Yes

Yes

Yes

Bad debt equation

No

No

Yes

bad debt predictor
in Return equation

No

Yes

Yes

-1298.69

-1174.00

9807.80

23

27

44

10023

10023

10023

AIC

2643.38

2402.00

-19527.60

BIC

2809.27

2596.74

-19210.24

Log Likelihood
Number of
parameters
Number of
observations
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Table 1.4: Demand Results – Continuous Response
Number of Orders Equation
Independent variables

DV = One-off order number
Coefficient

Intercept

t value

0.537

13.407

-0.006

-4.702

Total order number.^(2/3)

0.080

9.592

Hispanic order number

0.309

16.776

Hispanic order number.^(2/3)

-0.558

-13.235

One-off recent return number

-1.027

-7.125

One-off recent return number.^(2/3)

1.544

8.140

Previous mailings

0.207

8.178

Length of residence

0.011

7.109

-10.807

-10.203

11.382

10.898

Total order number

Net effect

0.619

-0.110

0.056

One-off bad debt ratio

0.066
One-off bad debt ratio.^(2/3)

Number of Returns Equation
Independent variables

DV = One-off return number
Coefficient

Intercept

t value

0.024

3.459

-0.245

-10.226

One-off recent return number.^(2/3)

0.505

16.091

Total order number

0.000

-0.576

Total order number.^(2/3)

0.003

2.268

Hispanic order number

0.032

7.018

-0.039

-5.427

Previous mailings

0.006

1.503

Length of residence

0.000

1.286

Hispanic payment number

-0.012

-3.721

Payments

-0.011

-5.373

One-off recent return number

Net effect

0.039

0.015
Hispanic order number.^(2/3)
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One-off bad debt ratio
One-off bad debt ratio.^(2/3)

Number of Bad Debts Equation
Independent variables

-1.004

-5.711

1.011

5.826

0.003

DV = One-off bad debt number
Coefficient

Intercept

t value

0.016

2.630

-3.096

-22.605

One-off bad debt ratio.^(2/3)

3.409

25.210

One-off recent return number

-0.032

-1.735

0.035

1.410

-0.001

-4.210

Total order number.^(2/3)

0.006

4.812

Hispanic order number

0.018

5.070

-0.020

-3.491

Previous mailings

0.003

0.896

Length of residence

0.000

1.722

Hispanic payment number

-0.009

-3.284

Payments

-0.012

-7.359

0.000

1.081

One-off bad debt ratio

Net effect

0.030

One-off recent return number.^(2/3)
Total order number

0.018

0.012
Hispanic order number.^(2/3)

Days Since Last Order
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Table 1.5: Descriptive Statistics – Discrete Response Model
Response
Model

Return

Variable

Description

Previous
mailings

The number of
mailings the customer
received in the past

0.36

0.64

0

5

One-off writeoff number

The number of onetime write-offs in the
past

0.03

0.24

0

10

Hispanic
payment
number

The number of
payments for
Hispanic products

1.84

2.72

0

45

One-off return
amount

The dollar amount of
one-time returns

1.51

8.45

0

285.69

Previous
mailings

The number of
mailings the customer
received in the past

0.36

0.64

0

5

The number of
payments in the last 5
transactions

2.78

1.60

0

5

The ratio of one-time
write-off count to
total write-off count

0.07

0.25

0

1

One-off return
number

The number of
cancels or returns in
the last 5 one-shot
transactions

0.26

0.70

0

5

Previous
mailings

The number of
mailings the customer
received in the past

0.36

0.64

0

5

Book write-off
number

The number of writeoffs for books

0.22

1.03

0

25

Hispanic order
number

The number of orders
for Hispanic products

2.24

3.01

0
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Total return
number

The number of all of
the returns in the past

1.74

5.05

0

110

Payments

One-off writeoff ratio

Bad debt

Paid

Mean

50

Std

Min

Max

Table 1.6: Demand Results - Discrete Choice Model with Heterogeneity and Endogeneity
Correction

Customer Response Model
Variable/Model Component
Coefficient
Return choice model component
Intercept_return
-5.916***
Previous mailings
0.246
One-off bad debt number
0.459***
Hispanic payment number
0.043
One-off return amount
0.030***
Bad debt Choice model component
Intercept_bad debt
-4.978***
Previous mailings
-1.146*
Payments
-0.401***
One-off bad debt ratio
2.003***
One-off return number
-0.608
Paid Choice model component
Intercept_paid
-3.883***
Previous mailings
-0.11
Book bad debt number
-0.051
Hispanic order number
0.070***
Total return number
0.014*
Heterogeneity covariance (Choleski
elements)
0.021
0.014
-0.018
0.009
-0.004
0.007
Firm Targeting Model
Coefficient
Intercept_target
-2.905***
Previous mailings
0.563***
Total return number
-0.007
Bad debts in last five transactions
-0.042
Payments
0.057***
Responded recently
-0.097*
std variance (heterogeneity)
-0.008
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t-value
-31.094
0.952
2.37
1.068
4.999
-18.016
-1.798
-3.677
6.258
-1.525
-53.575
-0.882
-0.854
5.791
1.728
0.14
0.09
-0.117
0.152
-0.08
0.12

t-value
-60.948
11.564
-1.485
-1.301
4.182
-1.875
-0.352

Table 1.7: Comparative Statics – Discrete Choice Model

Variables
One-off return amount

One-off return number

Total return number

Previous mailings

One-off bad debt number

One-off bad debt ratio

Book bad debt number

Hispanic payment number

Hispanic order number

Payments

top
bottom
difference
p-value
top
bottom
difference
p-value
top
bottom
difference
p-value
top
bottom
difference
p-value
top
bottom
difference
p-value
top
bottom
difference
p-value
top
bottom
difference
p-value
top
bottom
difference
p-value
top
bottom
difference
p-value
top
bottom
difference
p-value

mean
no order
bad debt
paid
60.381
0.892
0.009
0.099
27.400
0.934
0.008
0.058
32.981
-0.042
0.001
0.041
0.000
0.003
0.571
0.003
3.870
0.911
0.010
0.080
1.000
0.937
0.009
0.054
2.870
-0.027
0.001
0.026
0.000
0.002
0.757
0.002
38.420
0.905
0.010
0.085
1.000
0.933
0.013
0.053
37.420
-0.028
-0.003
0.031
0.000
0.000
0.385
0.000
3.120
0.956
0.001
0.043
1.000
0.944
0.004
0.052
2.120
0.012
-0.003
-0.009
0.000
0.008
0.000
0.046
1.650
0.885
0.040
0.075
1.000
0.901
0.037
0.062
0.650
-0.015
0.002
0.013
0.000
0.213
0.730
0.212
1.000
0.853
0.053
0.094
0.361
0.925
0.015
0.061
0.639
-0.072
0.038
0.033
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.013
7.830
0.903
0.043
0.055
1.000
0.919
0.036
0.046
6.830
-0.016
0.007
0.009
0.000
0.123
0.404
0.129
18.860
0.868
0.008
0.124
1.000
0.927
0.013
0.060
17.860
-0.058
-0.005
0.064
0.000
0.000
0.006
0.000
20.550
0.856
0.010
0.134
1.000
0.925
0.016
0.059
19.550
-0.069
-0.007
0.075
0.000
0.000
0.134
0.000
5.000
0.749
0.004
0.247
1.000
0.906
0.020
0.074
4.000
-0.157
-0.016
0.173
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000

52

Table 1.8: Impact of Product Returns Option Availability on Profits

Scenario

Product returns allowed
Product returns not
allowed

No
order

0.851

Return

0.027

0.872 N/A
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Bad
debt

Paid

0.020

0.101

0.021

0.107

Figure 1.1. Model Structure 1
Direct
mail

Return

Bad debt

Paid

No order

Figure 1.2. Model Structure 2

Direct
mail

Return

Order

No order

Bad debt

Paid

Figure 1.3. Model Structure 3
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Keep
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Figure 1.4: Direct Response Targeting Tradeoffs and Drivers
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Figure 1.5: The Numbers of Customers Targeted in Each Wave
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Figure 1.6: Profit Changes When b Changes (v fixed)
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Figure 1.7: Profit Changes When b Changes (c fixed)
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Figure 1.8: Profit Changes When c Changes (b fixed)
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Figure 1.9: Profit Changes When v Changes (b fixed)
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2

2.5

Chapter 2

A Structural Model of Default and Product Return Options with Implications for Return
Policies
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Abstract

Allowing product returns benefits firms in that it encourages customers to order products.
But firms have to balance between the increase in demand and the costs caused by product
returns. Previous research has focused on studying customers’ return behaviors but ignored the
option for customers to default. As recent research (Liu, Pancras and Houtz 2015) shows the
importance of incorporating information on customer default behaviors in firms’ targeting
policies, we study the question of how customers weigh their default and return options as well
as how firms should design their return policies when including the default option. We construct
a structural model with both return and default options included, and compare it with a model
that does not have a default option (Anderson, Hansen, and Simester 2009). We estimate the two
models with a sample panel dataset from a co-operative database. Our research finds that
customers have lower price sensitivity and higher transaction fit uncertainty if we ignore
defaults. The demand estimates can be biased and lead to a difference in firm’s optimal return
policies when we do not consider the default option. We also find that customers’ trade-offs
between return and default option are influenced by their return and default costs as well as the
transaction fit of the product. The paper illustrates the importance of including the default option
when estimating demand and studying the optimal return policies for firms. It also makes a
contribution to studying the relationship between product returns and defaults.

Keywords: Product return; Default; Direct mail
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1. Introduction
Product returns cost US retailers over $260.5 billion in 2015 according to the National
Retail Federation (NRF). They are a widespread and expensive problem for firms due to product
value depreciation and high labor costs corresponding to return-related operations such as
product handling or restocking costs. Retailers allow the product return option because it
provides customers with some value, and customers are more likely to order products with that
option available (e.g. Anderson, Hansen, and Simester 2009). At the same time, firms may
discourage excessive return behavior by charging a restocking fee for returned products or
allowing product returns in a more limited time period.
However, prior research on product returns has not considered the default option in which
customers keep the product without paying for it. These customers may either forget to pay for
the product or intentionally cheat the firm. Recent research (Liu, Pancras, and Houtz 2015) has
shown that firms can substantially improve profits by incorporating information on customer
default behaviors into their targeting policies. While both customers who choose to default and
those who return products are not willing to pay for the product, they are very different in terms
of their motivations and their potential value to the firm. This raises the research question that is
addressed in this paper: what is the trade-off between the default option and the return option for
customers?
In this paper, we set up a structural model to study the return costs and default costs for
customers, and apply the model to a sample dataset from a co-operative database in direct mail.
A key contribution of this paper is that we find out how customers choose between the return and
default option. When trading off between the two options, customers compare their return costs
and default costs, and prefer the option with lower cost. In an empirical application, we confirm
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that customers have considerable variation in their option costs for the returns and defaults.
Meanwhile, customers’ uncertainty about the transaction fit increases their preferences for the
return option over the default option. Transaction fit measures how much the product fits a
customer’s preferences. If a customer finds the product greatly different from expected, the fit of
the transaction is low.
Another contribution is that we find customers may be incorrectly classified as less price
sensitive when we ignore defaults. In the music category, demand is approximately 20% less
elastic when defaults are ignored. In the magazine and video categories, the differences in
demand elasticities due to ignoring defaults are even larger. The direction of these differences is
all negative, which can be partly explained by the nature of defaults. Because customers who
choose defaults do not pay for the product, their demand does not decrease when the price
increases.
This paper also contributes to helping firms design return policies when considering
defaults. We find that allowing product returns can increase probability that customers will pay
for their purchase, and increasing return costs at the same time can increase firms’ profits,
especially for product categories with higher transaction fit uncertainty. As return costs are
higher, customers make orders more cautiously, thus less likely to make returns afterwards,
which helps reduce firms’ loss from product returns.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the related
literature on product returns and defaults. In Section 3, we construct a structural model with both
return option and default option included. In section 4, we estimate the model using panel data
from a co-operative database. We present our findings in section 5 and use the estimates to
calculate changes in pay probabilities when the return option is removed. In section 6, we discuss
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the trade-off between the default and return options for customers and optimal return policy for
firms. We conclude in section 7.

2. Literature Review
Three broad questions related to product returns have been examined in the literature: (1)
why do customers need a product return policy? (2) why are product returns accepted by
manufacturers and retailers? and (3) how lenient should a product return policy be?
The biggest reason for product returns from customers is defective products. Fraudulent
returns receive increasing attention now, but they only account for a small percentage of the total
returns (NRF, 2015). In this paper, we focus on why customers find products do not fit their
preferences. Customers do not fully know their preferences for the products when they make
purchase decisions (Che, 1996). Especially in remote purchase environments, there are two
separate decisions in the purchase decision: consumers' decisions to order and, upon receipt, their
decisions to keep or return the item. Consumers' initial lack of experiential information makes
product choice riskier (Wood, 2001). Allowcustomers to return products lowers customers’
perceived risk of purchase (Petersen and Kumar, 2015). The value provided by the return option
is measured by Anderson, Hansen, and Simester (2009). They find that customers value the
return option more when they are more uncertain about whether the product will fit their
expectations.
On the other hand, researchers have studied why manufacturers accept returns from
retailers. Offering a refund for product returns can signal product quality (Moorthy and
Srinivasan, 1995), though sellers can cheat by sending false signals (Wood, 2001).
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Manufacturers can intensify retail competition by allowing product returns and thus improving
profitability (Padmanabhan and Png, 1997 & 2004). For durable products, such as books, a
returns policy option is likely to be offered to retailers because used goods are not going to lose
much of their consumer valuation compared with new products (Gümüs, Ray, and Yin, 2013).
For service products, the firm can increase profit by offering partial refunds for service
cancellations (Xie and Gerstner, 2007). Product return behavior can be managed to increase
lifetime value of customers. Customer value is maximized at an intermediate level of returns,
rather than either a complete absence or an extremely high level of returns (Petersen and Kumar,
2009). Accounting for product returns can also help firms target more profitable customers
(Petersen and Kumar, 2015).
As product returns cause an expensive cost for retailers and manufacturers, different return
policies are adopted to discourage product returns. Manufacturers and retailers can increase
return costs by offering partial credit for product returns, charging a shipping fee, or allow
product returns for a limited time, etc. For manufacturers, offering a partial credit for product
returns is optimal in a multi-retailer environment (Pasternack, 1985 & 2008), while a completecredit returns policy is optimal when several manufacturers compete on the same shelf space
with the same retailer (Bandyopadhyay and Paul, 2010). Retailers may charge a high return
penalty for customers when product returns are salvaged by a channel member, because the
retailer misses out on the generous refund from the manufacturer when the retailer salvages
returned units without the help of the manufacturer (Shulman, Coughlan, and Savaskan 2010).
As customers exhibit habitual behavior with respect to returning previously purchased products,
a stringent return policy should be introduced if a majority of serial returners are unprofitable for
the firm (Shah, Kumar, and Kim, 2014). However, retailers should be careful about raising return
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costs for customers because customers who paid for their product returns decreased their postreturn spending at that retailer; and those who had free returns increased their post-return
spending (Bower and Maxham III 2012). Some firms are trying to provide more uncertaintyreducing information in order to reduce product returns, but uncertainty-reducing information
also increases customers’ expectations and thus increases their likelihood of making returns
(Shulman, Cunha Jr, and Saint Clair 2015).
Prior research seldom considers the default option when studying product returns.
Customers who have defaulted may eventually pay back the debt or never pay back the debt
(Zhao, Zhao, and Song, 2009). The cost of defaults can be very high for direct marketers. Liu,
Pancras, and Houtz (2015) show that incorporating bad debt behaviors in a firm’s targeting can
significantly increase its profit. However, this research does not address loss caused by product
returns. Our paper considers both return option and default option in customers’ responses to
direct mail, and studies the trade-off between the two options. We also use the results to help
firms design return policies.

3. Model
We will first describe the model of product returns of Anderson, Hansen, and Simester (2009).
Note that this model does not consider the default option. Then we develop a joint model of product
returns and default.
3.1. Model 1 (Default not included)
Consider customer i who is deciding in period t whether to return or keep an item. We assume
that
U(Return)𝑖𝑡 = −𝑅𝑖

(1)
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𝑅𝑖 is the cost of returning the product and 𝑅𝑖 > 0. This item varies among individuals over
time.
U(keep)𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2)

Where
𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡

(3)

𝑋𝑖𝑡 contains one variable: average transaction amount in the past, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a standard
econometric error term that is known to the customer prior to a purchase. 𝜑𝑖𝑡 measures the fit of
the transaction. If the consumer finds the product greatly different from expected, the fit of the
transaction is low. For example, a customer may find the content in a magazine different from
what she expects, or the definition of a video not high enough. We assume that 𝜑𝑖𝑡 is only
observed by the customer after receiving the product and is never observed by the researcher.
𝜑𝑖𝑡 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜑2 )

(4)

When 𝜎𝜑 is high, customers are more likely to receive a product that is different from their
preferences, which means higher uncertainty about the transaction fit.
Whether a consumer keeps an item depends on the net utility compared to returning the
item. We refer to this as 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝐾 :
𝑈𝑖𝑡𝐾 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(5)

Define 𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(6)

𝐻(𝜔𝑖𝑡 , 𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑 ) = (𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑖 ) × Φ(

𝜔𝑖𝑡 +𝑅𝑖
𝜎𝜑

) + 𝜎𝜑 × 𝜙(

An order occurs if 𝜔𝑖𝑡 > 𝜛𝑖𝑡 , therefore we define
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𝜔𝑖𝑡 +𝑅𝑖
𝜎𝜑

) − 𝑅𝑖

(7)

𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑂 = −𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(8)

3.2 Model 2 (default included)
In this model, there are two stages in the consumer’s decision. In the first stage, the consumer
decides whether to keep or return the product. If the consumer decides to keep the product in the
first stage, he will decide whether to pay for the product or default in the second stage.
In the first stage, the utility for the return option is
U(Return)𝑖𝑡 = −𝑅𝑖

(9)

𝑅𝑖 is the cost of returning the product and 𝑅𝑖 > 0. This item varies among individuals over
time.
The utility for the keep option is obtained from the second stage. Assume the utilities for the
pay option and default options as following:
U(pay)𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑖𝑡

(10)

U(default)𝑖𝑡 = −𝐷𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡

(11)

Where
𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝑋𝑖𝑡

(12)

𝑋𝑖𝑡 contains one variable: average transaction amount in the past.
𝐷𝑖 is the cost of bad debt and 𝐷𝑖 > 0. This item varies among individuals. 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the
transaction amount in dollars, and 𝛼𝑖𝑡 measures the (dis)utility of that price for consumer i at
time t. We assume this random variable has a log-normal distribution:
ln(𝛼𝑖𝑡 )~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝛼2 )

(13)
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The mean of ln(𝛼𝑖𝑡 ) is assumed to be 0 so that the utility metric is equal to the dollar
metric.
𝜀𝑖𝑡 and 𝜑𝑖𝑡 are the same with those in model 1.
Whether a consumer pays for an item depends on the net utility compared to default. We
refer to this as 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑃 , which is defined as
𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑃 = 𝑈(𝑝𝑎𝑦)𝑖𝑡 − 𝑈(𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡)𝑖𝑡 = 𝐷𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑖𝑡

(14)

A consumer has the option of paying for an item or not in his purchase decision. We can
write the expected utility from keeping an item as
E[𝑈(𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡 ] = E[𝑈(𝑝𝑎𝑦)𝑖𝑡 |pay] 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑡 (pay) + E[𝑈(𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡)𝑖𝑡 |default]𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑡 (default)
(15)
E[𝑈(𝑝𝑎𝑦)𝑖𝑡 |pay] = E[𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 |𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑃 > 0] = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 − 𝑀𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸 [𝛼𝑖𝑡 |𝛼𝑖𝑡 <
𝐷𝑖
𝑀𝑖𝑡

] = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 − 𝑀𝑖𝑡 ×

𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑡×𝑓𝛼 (𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∫−∞
ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡)
)
𝜎𝛼

Φ(

2

= 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 − 𝑀𝑖𝑡 ×

𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡
(𝑙𝑛𝑡)
𝑒𝑥𝑝(− 2 )𝑑𝑡
∫−∞
2𝜎𝛼

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )
)
𝜎𝛼

=

𝜎𝛼 √2𝜋Φ(

2

𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 − 𝑀𝑖𝑡 ×

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )
𝜎
𝑒𝑥𝑝( 𝛼 )×Φ(
−𝜎𝛼 )
2

𝜎𝛼
ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )
)
Φ(
𝜎𝛼

(16)

Customer i expects to not pay for the order with probability
𝐷

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )

𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑡 (default|keep) = Pr(𝐷𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑖𝑡 < 0) = Pr (𝛼𝑖𝑡 > 𝑀 𝑖 ) = 1 − Φ (
𝑖𝑡

Φ (−

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )
𝜎𝛼

)

𝜎𝛼

)=
(17)

E[𝑈(𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡)𝑖𝑡 |𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑃 < 0] = −𝐷𝑖 +𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡
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(18)

Then the expected utility of keeping the product is
2

E[𝑈(𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡 ] = (𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 − 𝑀𝑖𝑡 ×

Φ (−

Φ (−

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )
𝜎𝛼
ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )
𝜎𝛼

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )
𝜎
𝑒𝑥𝑝( 𝛼 )×Φ(
−𝜎𝛼 )
2

)) + [−𝐷𝑖 +𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 ] × Φ (−
𝜎2

) − 𝑀𝑖𝑡 × 𝑒𝑥𝑝( 2𝛼) × Φ (

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )
𝜎𝛼

𝜎𝛼
ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )
)
Φ(
𝜎𝛼

) × (1 −

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )
𝜎𝛼

) = (𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 )−𝐷𝑖 ×

− 𝜎𝛼 )

(19)

Assume that
𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) = −𝐷𝑖 × Φ (−

𝜎2

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )
𝜎𝛼

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )

) − 𝑀𝑖𝑡 × 𝑒𝑥𝑝( 2𝛼) × Φ (

𝜎𝛼

− 𝜎𝛼 )
(20)

Then E[𝑈(𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡 ] = 𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡

(21)

Whether a consumer will keep the product depends on the net utility compared to returning
the product. We refer to this as 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝐾 , which is defined as
𝑈𝑖𝑡𝐾 = E[𝑈(𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡 ] − E[𝑈(𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 ] = 𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑖
(22)
There are two random variables 𝜀𝑖𝑡 and 𝜑𝑖𝑡 in equation (22). We assume the fit of
transaction 𝜑𝑖𝑡 to follow the normal distribution:
𝜑𝑖𝑡 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜑2 )

(23)

The expected utility of returning the product is
E[𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 |Return] = E[−𝑅𝑖𝑡 |𝑈𝑖𝑡𝐾 < 0] = −𝑅𝑖
The probability of keeping the product is
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(24)

𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑡 (Keep) = Pr(𝑈𝑖𝑡𝐾 > 0) = Pr(𝜑𝑖𝑡 > −[𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑖 ]) =
Φ{[𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑖 ]/𝜎𝜑 }

(25)

The expected utility of keeping the product is
E[𝑈(𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡 |Keep] = E[𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 |𝑈𝑖𝑡𝐾 > 0] = 𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) +
𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + E[𝜑𝑖𝑡 |𝜑𝑖𝑡 > −[𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑖 ] = 𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 +
𝜙{[𝐺(𝑀 ,𝐷 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡 +𝑅𝑖 ]/𝜎𝜑 }

𝜎𝜑 Φ{[𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎
𝑖𝑡

𝑖

(26)

𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡 +𝑅𝑖 ]/𝜎𝜑 }

Therefore, the expected utility from ordering the product is:
E[𝑈(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 ] = E[𝑈(𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 |Return] 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑡 (Return) +
E[𝑈(𝐾𝑒𝑒𝑝)𝑖𝑡 |Keep] 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑡 (Keep) = −𝑅𝑖 + [𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑅𝑖 ] ×
Φ[

𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡 +𝑅𝑖
𝜎𝜑

] + 𝜎𝜑 × 𝜙 [

𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑡 +𝑅𝑖
𝜎𝜑

] = 𝐻(𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑 , 𝜎𝛼 )
(27)

There is one random variable 𝜀𝑖𝑡 in equation (27). We assume the econometric error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡
to follow a normal distribution:
𝜀𝑖𝑡 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀2 )

(28)

The probability that the consumer orders a product is given by
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑡 (Order) = Pr(E[𝑈(𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟)𝑖𝑡 ] > 0|𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑 , 𝜎𝛼 ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑡 (𝐻(𝜇𝑖𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑 , 𝜎𝛼 ) > 0) = ∫ 1{𝐻(𝜇𝑖𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑡,𝑀𝑖𝑡,𝐷𝑖 ,𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑,𝜎𝛼)>0} 𝜙(𝜀𝑖𝑡 |0, 𝜎𝜀2 )𝑑𝜀𝑖𝑡
(29)
Define 𝜔𝑖 = 𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(30)
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𝐻(𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑 , 𝜎𝛼 ) = (𝜔𝑖 + 𝑅𝑖 ) × Φ(

𝜔𝑖 +𝑅𝑖
𝜎𝜑

) + 𝜎𝜑 × 𝜙(

𝜔𝑖 +𝑅𝑖
𝜎𝜑

) − 𝑅𝑖
(31)

To simplify notation, we denote the function in (31) as H.

𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝜔𝑖
𝜔𝑖 +𝑅𝑖
𝜎𝜑 √2𝜋

= Φ(

𝜔𝑖 +𝑅𝑖

× exp (−

𝜎𝜑

𝜔𝑖 +𝑅𝑖

) + (𝜔𝑖 + 𝑅𝑖 ) × 𝜙 (

(𝜔𝑖 +𝑅𝑖 )2
2
2𝜎𝜑

)−

𝜔𝑖 +𝑅𝑖
𝜎𝜑 √2𝜋

𝜎𝜑

× exp (−

𝜔 +𝑅
𝜕𝜙( 𝑖 𝑖 )

1

) × 𝜎 + 𝜎𝜑 ×
𝜑

(𝜔𝑖 +𝑅𝑖 )2
2
2𝜎𝜑

𝜎𝜑

𝜕𝜔𝑖

𝜔𝑖 +𝑅𝑖

) = Φ(

𝜎𝜑

𝜔𝑖 +𝑅𝑖

= Φ(

)>0

𝜎𝜑

)+
(32)

Therefore H monotonically increases with 𝜔𝑖 , and one can easily find that H has a negative
lower bound and a positive upper bound. Thus there is one and only one 𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑 ) for the H
function to be 0.
When𝜔𝑖 > 𝜛𝑖 , 𝐻(𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑 , 𝜎𝛼 ) > 0; when 𝜔𝑖 < 𝜛𝑖 , 𝐻(𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 ,
𝜎𝜑 , 𝜎𝛼 ) < 0
An order occurs when 𝜔𝑖 > 𝜛𝑖 .
We define
𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑂 = −𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑 ) + 𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(33)

The customer will order a product if 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑂 > 0. The customer will not order the product if
𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑂 < 0.
Then the probability of ordering the product is
Pr(𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑂 > 0|𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑 , 𝜎𝛼 ) = Φ(

−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝜎𝜀

)

Therefore the probabilities for the four outcomes are as following:
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(34)

1. No order.
Pr(𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑂 < 0|𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 ) = 1 − Φ(

−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝜎𝜀

)

(35)

2. Order and return
Pr(𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑂 > 0, 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝐾 < 0|𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 ) =
∫

∞
−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼)+𝜇𝑖𝑡
)
𝜎𝜀

−(

Φ(−

𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡 +𝜎𝜀 𝜀+𝑅𝑖
𝜎𝜑

) 𝜙(𝜀)𝑑𝜀

(36)

3. Order and default
Pr(𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑂 > 0, 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝐾 > 0, 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑃 < 0|𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 ) = Φ (−
∫

∞

−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼)+𝜇𝑖𝑡
−(
)
𝜎𝜀

Φ(

𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡 +𝜎𝜀 𝜀+𝑅𝑖
𝜎𝜑

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )
𝜎𝛼

)×

) 𝜙(𝜀)𝑑𝜀

(37)

4. Order and pay
Pr(𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑂 > 0, 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝐾 > 0, 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑃 > 0|𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 ) = Φ (
∫

∞

−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼)+𝜇𝑖𝑡
−(
)
𝜎𝜀

Φ(

𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡 +𝜎𝜀 𝜀+𝑅𝑖
𝜎𝜑

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )
𝜎𝛼

)×

) 𝜙(𝜀)𝑑𝜀

(38)

3.3 Identification
To estimate the model, we make the standard assumption that 𝜎𝜀 = 1. For a single category,
the information is not sufficient for identification, so we use a multi-category approach to
estimate the model. We select three categories: music, magazine, and video. We assume
𝜎𝜑𝑐 (𝑐 = 1, 2, 3) to vary over categories and 𝜎𝜑1 = 1. Return cost, default cost, and 𝜎𝛼 do not
vary over categories.
We collect all these parameters in the vector
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𝜃𝑖𝑡 = (log(𝑅𝑖 ) , log(𝐷𝑖 ) , 𝛽𝑖𝑡1 , 𝛽𝑖𝑡2 , 𝛽𝑖𝑡3 )

(39)

3.4. The option value of returns and defaults
For the option value of returns, we compare the demand when product returns are allowed
and when product returns are banned. In model 1, The probability change of a customer’s
ordering and keeping an item when product returns are banned is defined as ∆1 .
∆1 = Pr(𝑈 𝑂 > 0, 𝑈 𝐾 > 0) − lim Pr(𝑈 𝑂 > 0, 𝑈 𝐾 > 0) = Pr(𝑈 𝑂 > 0, 𝑈 𝐾 > 0) −
𝑅→∞

Pr(𝑈 𝑂 > 0)

(40)

In model 2, The probability change of a customer’s ordering and keeping and paying an
item when product returns are banned is defined as ∆2 .
∆2 = Pr(𝑈 𝑂 > 0, 𝑈 𝐾 > 0, 𝑈 𝑃 > 0) − lim Pr(𝑈 𝑂 > 0, 𝑈 𝐾 > 0, 𝑈 𝑃 > 0) =
𝑅→∞

Pr(𝑈 𝑂 > 0, 𝑈 𝐾 > 0, 𝑈 𝑃 > 0) − Pr(𝑈 𝑂 > 0, 𝑈 𝑃 > 0)

(41)

∆ refers to the demand change due to the return option. It can be either positive or negative
theoretically. Whether a customer make an order when product returns are allowed is decided by
her expected utility of ordering 𝐻(𝜔, 𝑅, 𝜎𝜑 ), while whether she makes an order when product
returns are banned is decided by 𝐻(𝜔 − 𝜋, 𝑅, 𝜎𝜑 ). Notice that 𝐻(𝜔, 𝑅, 𝜎𝜑 ) is monotonically
increasing with 𝜔 according to equation (32). When a customer has an 𝜔 large enough to make
𝐻(𝜔 − 𝜋, 𝑅, 𝜎𝜑 ) > 0, she will make an order no matter product returns are allowed or banned.
But when product returns are not allowed, she can only keep the product after ordering it. In this
case, ∆ is positive and it is better for firms to ban product returns. On the other hand, if a
customer has an 𝜔 that makes 𝐻(𝜔 − 𝜋, 𝑅, 𝜎𝜑 ) < 0 and 𝐻(𝜔, 𝑅, 𝜎𝜑 ) > 0, then whether product
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returns are allowed makes difference for her when she decides whether to order a product. ∆ can
be negative in this way and it’s better for firms to allow product returns.
For the option value of defaults, we compare the net demand when defaults are allowed and
not allowed. The probability change of a customer’s ordering and keeping and paying for an item
is
Λ = Pr(𝑈 𝑂 > 0, 𝑈 𝐾 > 0, 𝑈 𝑃 > 0) − lim Pr(𝑈 𝑂 > 0, 𝑈 𝐾 > 0, 𝑈 𝑃 > 0) =
𝐵→∞

Pr(𝑈 𝑂 > 0, 𝑈 𝐾 > 0, 𝑈 𝑃 > 0) − Pr(𝑈 𝑂 > 0, 𝑈 𝐾 > 0)

(43)

4. Empirical Application
We use panel data from co-operative databases, which include transaction information
from different direct marketing firms (organized by a third party). From many product categories
in the original dataset, we select three main categories: music, magazine and video. To estimate
our model, we randomly select 500 customers out of 28359 customers in the full sample data. In
our data, customers have four possible options: no order, pay, return, and default. We have
information about customers’ past purchase behaviors such as pay rate and return rate, and
information about firms’ promotional activities such as a promotional offer. There are also some
variables indicating customers’ demographical information: length of residence, age, and
income.
Table 2.1 shows the summary of customers’ transactions in the three categories. We can
find that customers have the lowest order rate but the highest pay rate in the magazine category.
The default rate is highest in the music category and lowest in the video category.
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*** INSERT TABLE 2.1***
Table 2.2.1 shows the statistics for transaction amounts of all observations. The mean of it
is as high as $ 5.3 in the video category, while as low as $ 1.0 in the magazine category. Also,
there is a huge variation in transaction amounts in the video category. Table 2.2.2 shows the
transaction amounts of all orders.
*** INSERT TABLE 2.2.1, 2.2.2***
Because the model is complicated, we select only one variable for 𝑋 to make the estimation
more simple. The variable is the average transaction amount in the past, which is supposed to
have a negative impact on the keep option, because customers might have not consumed the
product at home. For example, if they still have five magazines to read, they are less likely to
buy new magazines.
For estimation, we use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm of the Gibbs sampler form.
Appendix 2.1 shows each conditional distribution making up the Gibbs sampler. We run the
Markov Chain for a total of 30,000 iterations, dropping the first 10,000 as burn-in and then
retaining every 2nd of the next 20,000 iterations for analysis. In order to verify the estimation
method for our models, we first run a simulation study. There are 50 customers in the simulation
dataset, and each customer has 10 transactions in each category. Simulation results are in Appendix
2.2. We believe our estimation method is statistically effective as the true values are included in
95% confidence intervals.
5. Results
Table 2.3 shows the estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the model parameters.
Trace plots are in Appendix 2.3. Estimates for the covariance matrix are in Appendix 2.4. In
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Table 2.3, we observe negative effects of average transaction amount in the past for the keep
option in both models. This suggests that customers who have spent more for the product have
less demand for it, possibly because these customers haven’t run out of the product. The ranking
of the coefficients for the three categories are consistent in the two models, showing certain
consistency in the two models. We also notice that the negative effects decrease in all three
categories in Model 2, especially in the magazine category.
*** INSERT TABLE 2.3***
The primary parameters of interest are consumer return costs 𝑅𝑖 , consumer default costs 𝐷𝑖
and the degree of product uncertainty 𝜎𝜑 . The means of 𝑅𝑖 and 𝐷𝑖 for customers in our sample
are in Table 2.3. We plot the distributions of estimated return costs and default costs in Figure
2.1 and Figure 2.2. We observe considerable variation in return costs and default costs. We find
that consumer return costs are lower in model 2, probably because the utility metric equals to the
dollar metric in model 2 while there is no restriction for the utility metric in model 1. We also
find that consumer default costs are lower than consumer return costs in model 2. A possible
reason is that the return costs are easier for the customers to measure, such as the return shipping
fee and the inconvenience of going to a post office to drop the package. However the defaults
costs, such as the damage to credit, are more difficult to measure. Thus customers view a lower
cost for the default option.
*** INSERT FIGURE 2.1, 2.2***
For product uncertainty, we find that customers have highest uncertainty about product fit
for magazines, and lowest uncertainty about product fit for music in model 1. However, we
observe different results in model 2. Especially, we find that customers’ uncertainty about the
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product fit for magazine is lower than that for music. Results in model 2 seem to be more
reasonable, as magazines are published on a periodical basis, and customers can better predict
the product fit based on the previously published magazines. In both models, customers have
higher uncertainty about product fit for video than that for music. This is consistent with what we
expect, because music only contains sound, while video has both sound and picture. There is
more variation in video products than music products, leading to the difference in customers’
uncertainty.
One reason for the changes in product uncertainty in the two models lies in the default
option. Customers who choose to default has a lower perceived risk of buying a product that
does not fit their preferences, leading to a lower uncertainty about the transaction fit. That is why
𝜎𝜑 decreases when we consider defaults in model 2. We also notice that the rank of 𝜎𝜑 is
different in two models. 𝜎𝜑 is lowest in the music category in model 1, but lowest in the
magazine category in model 2. Because customers are more likely to return products when they
have higher uncertainty about the transaction fit, the rank of 𝜎𝜑 should be consistent with the
rank of return rate in the three categories. From Table 2.1, we know that the return rate is highest
(25%) in video category, and lowest (0%) in magazine category. Therefore, the estimates for 𝜎𝜑
in model 2 are more reasonable.
We also calculate the net demand change due to the default option defined in (43). The
average pay probability of customers’ ordering and keeping and paying for an item is 0.228
when defaults are allowed while it is 0.174 when defaults are not allowed. That is, the average
pay probability increases by more than 30% due to the default option, showing that it is
reasonable to allow defaults in this industry.
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6. Discussion
6.1. The influence of ignoring the default option
One consequence of ignoring defaults is a biased estimate for transaction fit. Comparing the
estimates in table 2.3, we find that 𝜎𝜑 is higher when we do not include a default option in the
model. A possible reason is that a customer who chooses to default has a lower perceived risk for
the product that does not fit her preferences, as the customer does not have a risk of paying for a
product that she does not want. When we ignore defaults, the perceived risk is higher, which is
captured in the transaction fit term, leading to higher uncertainty of transaction fit in the model
without a default option.
In the case where no defaults are considered, customers who actually choose defaults are
assumed to make payments in the future, so both payments and defaults are counted in net
demand. In order to examine how this influences price elasticities, we calculate them using the
method in Appendix 2.5, and show results in Table 2.4.
*** INSERT TABLE 2.4***
We find that customers are less price sensitive in each category when we ignore defaults.
Specifically, the demand elasticity is 20% lower in the music category, 23% lower in the
magazine category and 24% lower in the video category. A possible reason is that customers
who choose defaults do not want to pay for the product no matter how price changes. These
customers are far less price sensitive than those who want to pay for the products.
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Overall, we find two possible consequences of ignoring defaults in consumer behavior. One
is a biased estimate for the uncertainty about transaction fit, the other is that demand elasticity
can be remarkably underestimated when we do not take the default option into account. Our
results illustrate the importance of incorporating a default option in customers’ choice set.
6.2. Trade-off between return and default for customers
When we compare the utility functions of return and default options in (9) and (11), we can
easily tell that a customer’s trade-off between the two options are influenced by her transaction
fit and the difference between default cost and return cost. The influence of the option costs is
more straightforward as customers are trying to choose the option with lower cost. Customers are
less likely to choose the default option if their default costs are higher than return costs, vice
versa. Figure 2.3 shows the difference between customers’ return costs and default costs in our
data. We find that customers in our dataset have considerable variation in their default-return
cost difference.
*** INSERT FIGURE 2.3 ***
The other important factor affecting a customer’s trade-off between return and default
option is transaction fit. Table 2.5 shows the mean difference between default probability and
return probability in each category. We find customers prefer to return rather than default
when 𝜎𝜑 is higher, which is reasonable because customers are more likely to return rather than
keep the product when they have a higher uncertainty about the transaction fit.
*** INSERT TABLE 2.5 ***
To sum up, when customers trade off between return and default option, they compare the
costs of the two options, and prefer the option with a lower cost. Meanwhile, when the
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uncertainty about transaction fit is higher, customers are more likely to get a product that does
not fit their preferences, so they prefer to return rather than default.
6.3. The value of the return option for firms
To study the increase in net demand due to the return option, we calculate the probability
changes of customers’ paying for an item due to the return option defined as ∆ in (40) and (41).
Figure 2.4 shows histograms of ∆ in different categories in model 1, and Figure 2.5 shows
histograms of ∆ in different categories in model 2.
*** INSERT FIGURE 2.4, 2.5 ***
∆ can be either positive or negative theoretically. In the results of both models, the pay
probability changes are mostly positive, which means the pay probabilities mainly increase in
each category when product returns are allowed. Comparing the means of the probability
changes across categories, we can find that it is highest in video category and lowest in magazine
category, which is consistent with the estimates for 𝜎𝜑 . When customers have higher uncertainty
about the transaction fit, they are less likely to order the product if product returns are not
allowed. As a result, the net demand increases more when product returns are allowed. For
categories with higher transaction fit uncertainty, the return option offers more value for the
company.
We also find two impacts when defaults are ignored. One impact is that the company can
overestimate the value of return option when defaults are ignored, especially for the magazine
category where transaction fit uncertainty is low. As customers who choose to default do not
have the risk of paying for a product that does not fit their preferences, allowing product returns
or not has little influence on their purchase decision. The other impact is that there is more
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heterogeneity in the return option value when defaults are ignored. According to Table 2.3, there
is an upward bias in the estimates for transaction fit uncertainty when defaults are not
considered, leading to higher heterogeneity in customers’ willingness to return products. As a
result, there is more uncertainty for the net demand change when product returns are not allowed.

6.4. Optimizing return policies
Firms can have different return policies by changing the return costs for customers:
𝑅𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑤 = 𝐾𝑅̂𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛

(46)

K measures how lenient the return policy is. For the current return policy, K=1, and the
return costs are what we have estimated. The firm will have a more lenient return policy when
K>1, and a stricter one when K<1. In order to examine the optimal return option for firms, we
calculate firm profits for category j using the following formula
𝑁
𝑁
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑗 (𝐾) = 𝑚𝑗 ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑃𝑎𝑦 − 𝑐𝑗 ∑𝑖=1 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 − 𝑞𝑗 ∑𝑖=1 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡

(47)

When K changes, we can calculate the corresponding pay number, return number, and
default number. We assume that 𝑐𝑗 is 35% of 𝑚𝑗 , and 𝑞𝑗 is 20% of 𝑚𝑗 . The assumptions are
based on feedback from the management of a direct response company. We use estimates of
model 2 because defaults are not considered in model 1. Changes in the expected profit are
illustrated in figure 2.6.
*** INSERT FIGURE 2.6 ***
Our research helps firms decide the extent to how lenient their return policies should be.
Figure 2.6 shows that the optimal K is 3 in the music category, and 2.5 in the video category,
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while the current return policy is already the optimal one in the magazine category. We observe
an inverted U shape in all categories, which means that the profit increases before the optimal K
and decreases after the optimal K.
Among the three categories, we find the optimal return policy is more lenient in the music
and video category. Notice that the transaction fit uncertainty (𝜎𝜑 ) is also higher in these two
compared to the magazine category. As customers are more likely to receive a product that does
not fit their preferences in these categories, they are more likely to return products, causing
higher loss for firms. In this situation, it is necessary to allow product returns as discussed in the
previous section. But meanwhile, it is better for firms to increase return costs for customers so
that they will make orders more cautiously, which can help reduce firm’s loss from product
returns.
In general, firms should carefully compare different return costs in designing a return policy
when they decide that product returns are allowed. They may increase their profits by tightening
up the return policy in product categories where transaction fit uncertainty is high.

7. Conclusion
While previous research about product returns largely ignores default behaviors, this paper
constructs a structural model that includes both the default and return options. We find that
estimates for customers’ price sensitivity and transaction fit can be biased if we ignore the
default option, thus demonstrating the importance of incorporating the default option in
customers’ choice set. We also show that customers have considerable variation in their return
costs and default costs.
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When it comes to the trade-off between the return and default option, customers tend to
compare their return and default costs, and choose the option with lower cost. Also, when the
product fits the customer’s preferences better, customers are more likely to keep the product,
which means a preference for default over return.
This paper also finds that the firm may overvalue the return option when ignoring defaults.
If allowing product returns is better for the firm, they can use our model to further decide how
lenient the optimal return policy should be in each category. We find that the firm should allow
product returns in categories where product fit uncertainty is high. Meanwhile, they can have a
stricter return policy to increase profit.
There are some limitations in this research. First, we assume that customers decide to return
or keep the product first, and then decide whether to pay for the product or not. It is also possible
that customers make a decision about whether to pay for the product at first, and if they
determine not to pay for the product, they choose one between the return and default options.
Second, we estimate our model only for three product categories. Our results may not be
applicable to other product categories.
In spite of the limitations, our paper contributes to product returns in direct mail by studying
the trade-offs between the default option and return option. We find customers are less price
sensitive if defaults are not included, and our findings can help firms design optimal return
policies for categories with different uncertainties of transaction fit.
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Appendix 2.1: Samplings for model 2
𝑲
𝑷
1. Sampling 𝑼𝑶
𝒊𝒄𝒕 , 𝑼𝒊𝒄𝒕 , 𝑼𝒊𝒄𝒕
𝑂
𝐾
𝑃
𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
, 𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
, 𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
are sampled according to the purchase behavior of customer I in period t in
category c. There are four outcomes:
𝑂
1.1.No order: Here we only need to sample 𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑂
𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
~ 𝑇𝑁(−∞,0) (−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑𝑐 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝐺(𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ), 1)
(A1)

where 𝑇𝑁(𝑎,𝑏) (𝜇, 𝜎 2 ) denotes the normal distribution with mean 𝜇 and 𝜎 2 truncated to the
region (a, b).
1.2.Order and return: In this case, we sample the utilities as
1
𝑂
𝐾
𝐾
𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
|𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
~ 𝑇𝑁(0,∞) (−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑𝑐 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝐺(𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 1+𝜎2 (𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
− 𝐺(𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) − 𝑅𝑖 −
𝜑𝑐

𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡 ),

2
𝜎𝜑𝑐
2
1+𝜎𝜑𝑐

)

(A2)

𝑂
𝑂
𝐾
2
𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
|𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
~𝑇𝑁(−∞,0) (𝑅𝑖 + 𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑𝑐 ) + 𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
, 𝜎𝜑𝑐
)

(A3)

1.3.Order and keep and pay: In this case, we sample the utilities
1
𝑂
𝐾
𝐾
𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
|𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
~ 𝑇𝑁(0,∞) (−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑𝑐 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝐺(𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 1+𝜎2 (𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
− 𝐺(𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) − 𝑅𝑖 −
𝜑𝑐

𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡 ),

2
𝜎𝜑𝑐
2
1+𝜎𝜑𝑐

)

(A4)

𝑂
𝑂
𝐾
2
𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
|𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
~𝑇𝑁(0,∞) (𝑅𝑖 + 𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑𝑐 ) + 𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
, 𝜎𝜑𝑐
)

(A5)

(0, 𝜎𝛼2 )
𝐵
(−∞,ln( 𝑖 ))

ln(𝛼𝑖𝑡 ) ~𝑇𝑁

(A6)

𝑀𝑖𝑡

𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑃 = 𝐷𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑖𝑡

(A7)

1.4.Order and keep and default: In this case, we sample the utilities
1
𝑂
𝐾
𝐾
𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
|𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
~ 𝑇𝑁(0,∞) (−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑𝑐 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝐺(𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 1+𝜎2 (𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
− 𝐺(𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) − 𝑅𝑖 −
𝜑𝑐

𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡 ),

2
𝜎𝜑𝑐
2
1+𝜎𝜑𝑐

)

(A8)

𝑂
𝑂
𝐾
2
𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
|𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
~𝑇𝑁(0,∞) (𝑅𝑖 + 𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑𝑐 ) + 𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
, 𝜎𝜑𝑐
)

(0, 𝜎𝛼2 )
𝐵
(ln( 𝑖 ),∞)

ln(𝛼𝑖𝑡 ) ~𝑇𝑁

(A9)
(A10)

𝑀𝑖𝑡

𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑃 = 𝐷𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑖𝑡

(A11)

2. Sampling 𝜽𝒊 = (𝜷𝒊𝟏 , 𝜷𝒊𝟐 , 𝜷𝒊𝟑 , 𝒍𝒏𝑹𝒊 , 𝒍𝒏𝑫𝒊 )
2.1.Sample 𝛽𝑖𝑐 |𝜃−𝛽𝑖𝑐 , c = 1, 2, 3.
𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡 ≡ 𝛽′𝑖𝑐 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡

(A12)

𝑂
𝑂
𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
+ 𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑𝑐 ) − 𝐺(𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) = 𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡

(A13)

The conditional distribution for 𝛽𝑖𝑐 is normal with precision and mean:
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𝑝𝑖𝑐 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑋′𝑖𝑐𝑡 + Λ𝛽𝑖𝑐

(A14)

𝑂
−1
𝜇𝑖𝑐 = 𝑝𝑖𝑐
((∑ 𝑋 ′ 𝑖𝑐𝑡 [𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
+𝜔
̿(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑𝑐 ) − 𝐺(𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 )]) + Λ𝛽𝑖𝑐 μ𝛽𝑖𝑐 )

(A15)

Where Λ𝛽𝑖𝑐 and μ𝛽𝑖𝑐 is the precision and mean of the prior distribution of 𝛽𝑖𝑐 conditional on
𝛽𝑖𝑐′, 𝑐′ ≠ 𝑐 and 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖 , 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖 .
2.2.Sample 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖
We use a Metropolis-Hastings method to sample 𝑅̃𝑖 ≡ 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖
𝑇𝑖𝑐
𝑂
p(𝑅̃𝑖 | ∙) ∝ ∏3𝑐=1{∏𝑡=1
𝜙(𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
| − 𝜛(exp(𝑅̃𝑖 ) , 𝜎𝜑𝑐 ) + 𝐺(𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡 , 1) ×
𝑂
𝐾
2
∏𝑡:𝐷𝑂 =1 𝜙(𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
| exp(𝑅̃𝑖 ) + 𝜛(exp(𝑅̃𝑖 ) , 𝜎𝜑𝑐 ) + 𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
, 𝜎𝜑𝑐
)} × 𝜙(𝑅̃𝑖 |μ𝑅̃𝑖 , Λ 𝑅̃𝑖 )
𝑖𝑐𝑡

(A16)

𝑂
where 𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡
= 1 indicates that an order was placed. Λ 𝑅̃𝑖 and μ𝑅̃𝑖 is the precision and mean of
the prior distribution of 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖 conditional on 𝛽𝑖𝑐′, 𝑐 = 1, 2, 3 and 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖 . Here we use a MetropolisHastings step centered at the previous draw of 𝑅̃𝑖 with a normally distributed step size.

2.3.Sample 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖
̃𝑖 ≡ 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖
We use a Metropolis-Hastings method to sample 𝐷
𝑂
𝑖𝑐
̃𝑖 | ∙) ∝ ∏3𝑐=1{∏𝑇𝑡=1
̃𝑖 ), 𝜎𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡 , 1) ×
p(𝐷
𝜙(𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
| − 𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑𝑐 ) + 𝐺(exp(𝐷
𝑃
̃𝑖 ) − 𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡 |𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑐𝑡 , 𝜎𝛼2 )} × 𝜙(𝐷
̃𝑖 |μ𝐷̃ , Λ 𝐵̃ )
∏𝑡:𝐷𝐾 =1 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 (exp(𝐷
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖𝑐𝑡

(A17)

𝐾
where 𝐷𝑖𝑐𝑡
= 1 indicates that an order was kept. Λ 𝐷̃𝑖 and μ𝐷̃𝑖 is the precision and mean of
the prior distribution of 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖 conditional on 𝛽𝑖𝑐′, 𝑐 = 1, 2, 3 and 𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑖 . Here we use a Metropolis̃𝑖 with a normally distributed step size.
Hastings step centered at the previous draw of 𝐷

3. Sampling 𝝈𝝋𝒄 , 𝝈𝜶
3.1.Sample 𝜎𝜑𝑐 , c = 2, 3.
1

𝜏𝜑𝑐 ≡ 𝜎2

(A18)

𝜑𝑐

𝑇

𝑂
𝑖𝑐
p(𝜏𝜑𝑐 | ∙) ∝ ∏𝑁
𝑖=1{∏𝑡=1 𝜙(𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡 | − 𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜏𝜑𝑐 ) + 𝐺(𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡 , 1) ×
𝑂
𝐾
−1
∏𝑡:𝐷𝑂 =1 𝜙(𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
|𝑅𝑖 + 𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜏𝜑𝑐 ) + 𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
, 𝜏𝜑𝑐
)} × 𝑝(𝜏𝜑𝑐 )
𝑖𝑐𝑡

(A19)

where 𝑝(𝜏𝜑𝑐 ) is the prior distribution of 𝜏𝜑𝑐 . We use a gamma distribution 𝐺(𝛼 = 2, 𝛽 =
1) as a prior for 𝜏𝜑𝑐 . We change the parametrization to the log scale, 𝑙𝑛𝜏𝜑𝑐 , and sample
𝑙𝑛𝜏𝜑𝑐 using a random walk MH step centered on the previous value of 𝑙𝑛𝜏𝜑𝑐 with a
normally distributed step size.
3.2.Sample 𝜎𝛼
1
𝜏𝛼 ≡ 𝜎 2

(A20)

𝛼

𝑇

𝑂
𝑖𝑐
p(𝜏𝛼 | ∙) ∝ ∏𝑁
𝑖=1{∏𝑡=1 𝜙(𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡 | − 𝜛(𝑅𝑖 , 𝜎𝜑𝑐 ) + 𝐺(𝐷𝑖 , 𝜏𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑐𝑡 , 1) ×
𝑃
∏𝑡:𝐷𝐾 =1 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 (𝐷𝑖 − 𝑈𝑖𝑐𝑡
|𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑐𝑡 , 𝜏𝛼 )} × 𝑝(𝜏𝛼 )
𝑖𝑐𝑡
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(A21)

where 𝑝(𝜏𝛼 ) is the prior distribution of 𝜏𝛼 . We use a gamma distribution 𝐺(𝛼 = 2, 𝛽 = 1)
as a prior for 𝜏𝛼 . We change the parametrization to the log scale, 𝑙𝑛𝜏𝛼 , and sample 𝑙𝑛𝜏𝛼 using a
random walk MH step centered on the previous value of 𝑙𝑛𝜏𝛼 with a normally distributed step
size.

88

Appendix 2.2: Simulation results
There are 50 customers in the simulation dataset, and each customer has 10 transactions in
each category. For estimation, we use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm of the Gibbs sampler
form. Appendix 1 shows each conditional distribution making up the Gibbs sampler. We run the
Markov Chain for a total of 30,000 iterations, dropping the first 10,000 as burn-in and then
retaining every 2nd of the next 20,000 iterations for analysis. All of the true values are included in
95% confidence intervals, so we believe our estimation method is statistically effective. The details
of simulation results for our models are as follows.
1. Results for Model 1
Table A2.1: Estimates and 95% credibility intervals for all variables
Variable

True value

Estimate

95% Lower bound

95% Upper bound

phi2

4

4.3

3.8

4.9

phi3

7

7.7

6.5

9.0

logR

0.9

0.9

0.7

1.0

beta1

2.2

1.8

1.4

2.2

beta2

3.3

3.4

2.8

4.0

beta3

4.0

4.9

3.2

7.6

Table A2.2: True values for covariance matrix
Covariance

logR

beta1

beta2

beta3

logR

0.9

1.0

1.1

1.8

beta1

1.0

5.2

4.1

4.9

beta2

1.1

4.1

7.9

6.8

beta3

1.8

4.9

6.8

8.3

Table A2.3: Estimates for covariance matrix
Covariance logR

beta1

beta2

beta3

logR

1.1

0.9

0.5

1.2

beta1

0.9

6.0

2.0

2.8

beta2

0.5

2.0

6.5

7.5

beta3

1.2

2.8

7.5

14.5
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Table A2.4: Lower bounds of 95% credibility intervals for covariance matrix
Covariance logR

beta1

beta2

beta3

logR

0.9

0.4

0.1

0.3

beta1

0.4

3.8

0.3

0.3

beta2

0.1

0.3

3.8

2.4

beta3

0.3

0.3

2.4

3.8

Table A2.5: Upper bounds of 95% credibility intervals for covariance matrix
Covariance logR

beta1

beta2

beta3

logR

1.3

1.5

1.3

2.5

beta1

1.5

9.3

3.6

6.3

beta2

1.3

3.6

9.3

12.3

beta3

2.5

6.3

12.3

35.1

2. Results for Model 2

Table A2.6: Estimates and 95% credibility intervals for all variables
True
Variable value

95%
Lower
Estimate bound

95%
Upper
bound

logR

0.50

0.51

0.42

0.61

logD

1.60

1.61

1.57

1.65

beta1

7.00

6.85

6.44

7.27

beta2

6.00

6.08

5.82

6.35

beta3

4.00

3.99

3.58

4.34

phi2

3.00

2.94

2.77

3.08

phi3

1.50

1.68

1.54

1.83

alpha

1.30

1.29

1.23

1.34
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Table A2.7: True values for covariance matrix
Covariance logR

logD

beta1

beta2

beta3

logR

0.25

0.25

0.50

0.50

0.50

logD

0.25

1.25

1.50

1.50

1.50

beta1

0.50

1.50

3.00

3.00

2.10

beta2

0.50

1.50

3.00

4.00

3.10

beta3

0.50

1.50

2.10

3.10

4.01

Table A2.8: Estimates for covariance matrix
Covariance logR

logD

beta1

beta2

beta3

logR

0.27

0.27

0.52

0.34

0.68

logD

0.27

1.09

1.38

1.03

0.69

beta1

0.52

1.38

2.10

0.99

2.02

beta2

0.34

1.03

0.99

3.89

0.98

beta3

0.68

0.69

2.02

0.98

5.73

Table A2.9: Lower bounds of 95% credibility intervals for covariance matrix
Covariance logR

logD

beta1

beta2

beta3

logR

0.22

0.21

0.41

0.25

0.09

logD

0.21

1.00

1.22

0.59

-0.44

beta1

0.41

1.22

1.03

-0.04

1.68

beta2

0.25

0.59

-0.04

3.30

-2.16

beta3

0.09

-0.44

1.68

-2.16

4.31
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Table A2.10: Upper bounds of 95% credibility intervals for covariance matrix
Covariance logR

logD

beta1

beta2

beta3

logR

0.31

0.34

0.63

0.43

1.27

logD

0.34

1.17

1.53

1.48

1.82

beta1

0.63

1.53

3.17

2.01

2.37

beta2

0.43

1.48

2.01

4.49

4.13

beta3

1.27

1.82

2.37

4.13

7.14
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Appendix 2.3: Traceplots for two models

Figure A1: Trace plots in model 1
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Figure A2: Trace plots in model 2
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Appendix 2.4: Estimates of covariance matrix in two models

Table A2.11: Estimates of covariance matrix in model 1
Covariance logR

beta1

beta2

beta3

logR

0.54

-1.03

-2.31

-1.51

beta1

-1.03

12.58

16.64

12.17

beta2

-2.31

16.64

57.88

27.62

beta3

-1.51

12.17

27.62

29.36

Table A2.12: 95% confidence interval lower bounds of covariance matrix in model 1
Covariance logR

beta1

beta2

beta3

logR

0.43

-1.34

-2.87

-1.94

beta1

-1.34

10.56

12.55

8.42

beta2

-2.87

12.55

38.71

21.72

beta3

-1.94

8.42

21.72

23.29

Table A2.13: 95% confidence interval upper bounds of covariance matrix in model 1
Covariance logR

beta1

beta2

beta3

logR

0.65

-0.74

-1.73

-1.12

beta1

-0.74

16.29

21.04

15.43

beta2

-1.73

21.04

71.52

32.99

beta3

-1.12

15.43

32.99

35.94

Table A2.14: Estimates of covariance matrix in model 2
Covariance logR

logD

beta1

beta2

beta3

logR

0.23

0.01

-0.77

-1.70

-0.94

logD

0.01

0.89

1.35

1.47

1.08

beta1

-0.77

1.35

10.98

14.56

8.86

beta2

-1.70

1.47

14.56

55.95

23.52

beta3

-0.94

1.08

8.86

23.52

22.45
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Table A2.15: 95% confidence interval lower bounds of covariance matrix in model 2
Covariance logR

logD

beta1

beta2

beta3

logR

0.18

-0.04

-1.10

-2.34

-1.32

logD

-0.04

0.77

0.97

0.67

0.63

beta1

-1.10

0.97

8.81

11.11

6.45

beta2

-2.34

0.67

11.11

45.81

19.61

beta3

-1.32

0.63

6.45

19.61

17.68

Table A2.16: 95% confidence interval upper bounds of covariance matrix in model 2
Covariance logR

logD

beta1

beta2

beta3

logR

0.29

0.06

-0.50

-1.16

-0.62

logD

0.06

1.02

1.72

2.29

1.56

beta1

-0.50

1.72

13.52

17.31

11.43

beta2

-1.16

2.29

17.31

65.36

28.47

beta3

-0.62

1.56

11.43

28.47

29.42
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Appendix 2.5: Price elasticities for model 2

We first calculate the marginal effect of a price change on G.
𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) = −𝐷𝑖 × Φ (−

𝜎2

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )
𝜎𝛼

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )

) − 𝑀𝑖𝑡 × 𝑒𝑥𝑝( 2𝛼) × Φ (

𝜎𝛼

− 𝜎𝛼 )

(A22)

Notice that 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the price.
𝜕𝐺

= −𝜎

𝜕𝑀𝑖𝑡
ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )

𝜙(

𝜎𝛼

𝐷𝑖

𝛼 𝑀𝑖𝑡

× 𝜙 (−

2

𝜎𝛼2

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )

) − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ( 2 ) × Φ (

𝜎𝛼

𝜎𝛼

− 𝜎𝛼 ) +

𝜎
𝑒𝑥𝑝( 𝛼 )
2

𝜎𝛼

×

− 𝜎𝛼 )

(A23)

1. The marginal effect of a price change on the order probability is
𝑂
𝜕 Pr(𝑈𝑖𝑡

> 0|𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 )
𝜕𝑀𝑖𝑡

= 𝜙(

−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝜎𝜀

1

𝜕𝐺

) × 𝜎 × 𝜕𝑀
𝜀

(A24)

𝑖𝑡

2. The marginal effect of a price change on the order-and-return probability is
𝑂
𝜕 Pr(𝑈𝑖𝑡

> 0, 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝐾 < 0|𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 )

𝜕𝑀𝑖𝑡
−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡

𝜙(

Φ(

1

𝜕𝐺

= 𝜎 × 𝜕𝑀 × Φ (−
𝜀

1

𝑖𝑡

𝑅𝑖 +𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡

𝜕𝐺

)− ×

𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝑅𝑖

̅
𝜎𝜀
𝜎
𝜕𝑀𝑖𝑡
(−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡 )/𝜎𝜀 +𝜇𝜀

×𝜙(

̅
𝜎

𝜎𝜑

)×

)×

)

̅
𝜎𝜑 /𝜎

(A25)

where
𝜎̅ = √𝜎𝜑2 + 𝜎𝜀2

(A26)

𝜎

𝜇𝜀 = − 𝜎̅𝜀2 × (𝑅𝑖 + 𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝜎𝛼 ) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 )

(A27)

3. The marginal effect of a price change on the order-and-keep-and-pay probability is
𝑂
𝜕 Pr(𝑈𝑖𝑡

> 0, 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝐾 > 0, 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑃 > 0|𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 )
𝜕𝑀𝑖𝑡

∫

∞

−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡
)
−(
𝜎𝜀

𝑅𝑖 +𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡

𝜙(
𝜙(

𝜎𝜀

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )

1

𝛼 𝑀𝑖𝑡

𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡 +𝜎𝜀 𝜀+𝑅𝑖

Φ(

𝜎𝜑
̅
𝜎𝜑 /𝜎
1

𝜕𝐺

) × 𝜎 × 𝜕𝑀 ]
𝜀

×𝜙(

)×

𝜎𝛼
ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )

1

𝜕𝐺

𝜎𝛼

𝜎

𝜕𝑀𝑖𝑡

) 𝜙(𝜀)𝑑𝜀 + Φ (

(−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡 )/𝜎𝜀 +𝜇𝜀

) × Φ(

̅
𝜎
−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡

= −𝜎

) × [̅ ×

𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝑅𝑖

)+Φ(

𝜎𝜑

×

)×
(A28)

𝑖𝑡

4. The marginal effect of a price change on the order-and-keep-and-bad-debt probability is
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𝑂
𝜕 Pr(𝑈𝑖𝑡

> 0, 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝐾 > 0, 𝑈𝑖𝑡𝑃 < 0|𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖 )
𝜕𝑀𝑖𝑡

∫

∞

−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡
)
−(
𝜎𝜀

𝑅𝑖 +𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡

𝜙(
𝜙(

=𝜎

1

𝛼 𝑀𝑖𝑡

𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡 +𝜎𝜀 𝜀+𝑅𝑖

Φ(

𝜎𝜑

×𝜙(

𝜎𝜀

̅
𝜎𝜑 /𝜎
1

𝜕𝐺

) × 𝜎 × 𝜕𝑀 ]
𝜀

)×

𝜎𝛼
ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )

) 𝜙(𝜀)𝑑𝜀 + Φ (−

(−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡 )/𝜎𝜀 +𝜇𝜀

) × Φ(

̅
𝜎
−𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝐺(𝑀𝑖𝑡 ,𝐷𝑖 ,𝜎𝛼 )+𝜇𝑖𝑡

ln(𝐷𝑖 /𝑀𝑖𝑡 )

𝜎𝛼

𝜛(𝑅𝑖 ,𝜎𝜑 )+𝑅𝑖

)+Φ(

𝜎𝜑

1

𝜕𝐺

) × [𝜎̅ × 𝜕𝑀 ×
𝑖𝑡

)×
(A29)

𝑖𝑡

Having computed the marginal effects, we can easily obtain elasticities by the following
formula
𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =

𝑑𝑃𝑟
𝑑𝑀

×

𝑀

(A30)

𝑃𝑟
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Sample Data
Category
Number of
customers

Music

Magazine Video

Total

172

370

110

500

16398

31628

10645

58671

Number of orders

2635

1480

1970

6085

Order rate
(orders|observations)

16%

5%

19%

10%

Pay rate
(payments|orders)

77%

92%

72%

79%

Return rate
(returns|orders)

13%

0%

25%

14%

Default rate
(defaults|orders)

10%

8%

2%

7%

Number of
observations
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Table 2.2.1: Transaction Amount in Dollars for All Observations
Category

Mean

Median Min

Max

Std

Music

1.7

0

0

117.8

5.7

Magazine

1.0

0

0

180.0

6.1

Video

5.3

0

0

2733.2

29.4

Total

2.0

0

0

2733.2

13.7

Table 2.2.2: Transaction Amount in Dollars for All Orders
Category

Mean

Median Min

Max

Std

Music

10.6

5.1

0.16

117.8

10.2

Magazine

21.9

19.0

0.01

180.0

18.5

Video

28.4

25.9

1

2733.2

63.4

Total

19.1

20.2

0.01

2733.2

38.6
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Table 2.3: Results of Two Models
Model
Variabl
e
ln(𝑅)

Model 1
95% Lower
Estimate bound
0.85

Model 2 (defaults considered)
95% Upper
bound

0.77

95% Lower
Estimate bound
0.91

NA

ln(𝐷)

95% Upper
bound

0.44

0.35

0.52

-1.49

-1.58

-1.40

𝛽1

-2.70

-2.97

-2.39

-2.80

-3.10

-2.54

𝛽2

-5.69

-6.18

-4.96

-5.70

-6.10

-5.12

𝛽3

-3.66

-4.08

-3.38

-3.60

-4.11

-3.24

4.36

4.26

4.45

𝜎𝛼

NA

𝜎𝜑1

Normalized as 1

Normalized as 1

𝜎𝜑2

1.24

1.19

1.30

0.58

0.53

0.63

𝜎𝜑3

1.59

1.51

1.67

1.13

1.07

1.18
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Table 2.4: Price Elasticities When Defaults Included and Not
Category

Music

Magazine Video

Keep (defaults ignored)

-1.063

-1.043

-1.042

Keep and pay

-1.330

-1.358

-1.363

-20%

-23%

-24%

Change when defaults are ignored

Table 2.5: Customers’ Preferences for Return Over Default Option
Category
Pr(Return) -Pr(Default)

Music

Magazine Video

0.024

0.010

0.033

1

0.58

1.13

𝜎𝜑

102

Figure 2.1: Histograms of Customer Return Costs (𝐑) in Model 1
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Figure 2.2.1: Histograms of Customer Return Costs (𝐑) in Model 2

Figure 2.2.2: Histograms of Customer Default Costs (D) in Model 2
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Figure 2.3: Histograms of 𝑹𝒊 − 𝑫𝒊 in Model 2
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Figure 2.4: Histograms of ∆ in Model 1
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Figure 2.5: Histograms of ∆ in Model 2
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Figure 2.6: Expected Firm Profits Under Different Return Policies
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Concluding Chapter

This paper studies the customers’ responses to direct mail considering both the default and
return options. Essay 1 demonstrates the importance of using the historical transaction
information variables that influence the customers’ return, default, and pay options in firms’
targeting. It also studies the impact of removing the product return option, showing that the
customers with high return numbers in the past are more likely to pay rather than default if
product returns are not allowed. I find that firms can increase profits by forbidding product
returns if return costs are very high. Results in essay 1 show a negative relationship between
customers’ preferences for defaults and product returns, because customers who frequently
return products in the past are unlikely to default.
Essay 2 further illustrates the importance of considering defaults in customers’ responses in
direct mail industry and studies the relationship between customers’ default and return options. I
find that estimates for customers’ price sensitivity and transaction fit can be biased if defaults are
not considered. The firm may overvalue the return option when ignoring defaults. When
customers choose between the return and default option, they consider two factors. One is the
difference between their return and default costs. Results show that customers have considerable
variation in their return costs and default costs. The other factor is transaction fit uncertainty.
Customers have a preference for default over return when transaction fit uncertainty is low.
Essay 2 also provides a way to decide how lenient the optimal return policy should be in each
category when defaults are possible. It suggests that firms should allow product returns in
categories where product fit uncertainty is high and have a stricter return policy to increase
profit.
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My research focuses on customers’ responses in direct mail industry and the corresponding
targeting policy and return policy, but it is also helpful for studying these problems in
ecommerce. Traditionally, direct marketers should carefully select customers to target because of
the considerable cost of contacting customers offline. In digital marketing, the cost of contacting
a customer online (such as email) is almost zero compared to the cost of a direct mail. Firms are
able to contact a large number of customers at a low cost in digital marketing. However, this
does not mean that targeting is no longer important. In the digital age, customers are also
receiving an explosive increase of online direct marketing offers. They are much more likely to
ignore these offers compared to the traditional direct mails. In order to have more responses,
direct marketers should even pay more attention to targeting, sending the right offer to the right
customer.
My research helps firms target customers in direct mail marketing, showing that firms
should use information of customers’ three behaviors (return, default, and pay) instead of
accounting for pay behavior only. This philosophy of considering customers’ various behaviors
in targeting is also useful in digital marketing. It is important to use information of customers’
profitable choices such as pay to select customers. Meanwhile, it is necessary for firms to
consider customers’ unprofitable choices and even some variables that are not directly related to
their purchases. Nowadays online direct marketers have huge information about their customers,
and it is not wise to waste such information.
Product returns are also a big problem in ecommerce. The problem is even more
complicated because customers have various reasons to return. In direct mail marketing,
customers return products due to the poor transaction fit. In digital marketing, customers may
‘default’ in the form of returning a product. Although customers are not able to make a default
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choice as in this paper because they need to leave their payment information when making
orders, they may return satisfactory products after using them. For example, a customer buys a
dress for a special event, and return it after the event. She returns the product not because the
transaction fit is poor, but because she does not want to pay. Such fraudulent product returns
cause considerable costs for retailers. Besides, customers might order some products only to
qualify for free shipping. They are going to return these products anyway, which is not related to
transaction fit.
When we study product returns in ecommerce, we need to be clear about the different
reasons about customers’ return behaviors. It is also necessary to consider default cost in
customer’s return option. The method of studying default behaviors in this paper helps study
fraudulent product returns in digital marketing. My paper also studies the extent to how lenient a
firm’s return policy should be by simulating profits under different return costs. In ecommerce,
firms change return costs mainly through three aspects: return shipping fee, restocking fee, how
easy the return process is. In the future, it may be interesting to study the importance of each of
the three aspects for customers. For example, customers may prefer to pay no return shipping fee
rather than have an easy return process.
In summary, this paper contributes to direct marketing by studying defaults together with
product returns. It suggests firms consider customers’ various purchase behaviors in direct mail
targeting, which may also apply to targeting in ecommerce. In addition, the paper studies firms’
optimal return policies in direct mail industry, providing a first step in studying the complicated
return behaviors in ecommerce.
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